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Abstract 
This paper provides an update and a reflection on an earlier study commissioned by the 
Ministry of education about the challenges posed to educational governance in Austria. It 
starts with three contradictory observations, first a considerable gap between high 
expenditure and weak results in international Assessments, second the prevailing perception 
in Austrian education policy discourses that despite the high expenditure resources would 
lack in relation to demands, and third a widespread consensus about serious deficiencies of 
the governance structure, being too complex and giving schools not enough responsibilities 
and room for manoeuvre. The paper tries to explain these contradictory issues by taking up 
the argument of the earlier study, and to deepen the argument by additional illustrations and 
analyses. A path for improvement is sketched that would need quite far reaching changes in 
the existing governance structures. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Papier reflektiert und ergänzt eine frühere Studie im Auftrag des 
Bildungsministeriums über die Verwaltung des österreichischen Schulwesens. 
Ausgangspunkt sind drei widersprüchliche Beobachtungen, erstens die Kluft zwischen 
hohen Ausgaben und schwachen Leistungen in den internationalen Testungen, zweitens die 
verbreitete Wahrnehmung in den politischen Diskursen, dass trotz der hohen Ausgaben zu 
wenig Ressourcen verfügbar wären, und drittens ein breiter Konsens über Defizite des 
Governance-Systems mit zu hoher Komplexität und zu wenig Verantwortung und Spielraum 
bei den Schulen. Es wird versucht auf Basis der Ergebnisse und Argumentationen der 
früheren Studie diese Widersprüche aufzuklären und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten auszuloten.  
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Contextual elements of Austrian educational governance 
The basic structures of Austrian education have survived quite fundamental regime changes 
since the Habsburg Monarchy through the 1st Republic in the interwar period, followed by 
two fascist regimes, into the 2nd Republic. These changes have brought a legacy of 
conflicting positions (between the state and the Catholic Church about the role of religion, 
between the Social Democrats and the Christian parties about equity, between the City of 
Vienna and the rural provinces about the structure of schools and the methodology of 
education, between the employers and the employees about the structure and methodology 
of apprenticeship and vocational education), which have resulted in a complex school 
structure and a complex governance system tightly embedded in the basic structures of the 
polity and its administrative apparatus. On this background the Austrian education system 
comprises several quite exceptional elements or positioning compared to other countries: 
- high degree of public financing, but much non-financial private contributions through clear 
half-day schooling and need of home support for learning, deficiencies of child care 
infrastructures, etc. 
- very early tracking between an academic track (AHS Allgemeinbildende Höhere Schule) 
and a common track (Hauptschule, now Neue Mittelschule) at age 10 
- early starting (at age 15 within compulsory school) and very widespread vocational 
education (VET) at upper secondary level (one of the highest participation rates in VET) 
- comprising a strong VET fulltime school system and a strong traditional apprenticeship 
system based on enterprise training and part time schooling 
- a quite strong path for extended education careers through the common school (requiring 
good achievement results) and vocational education up to higher education, thus creating an 
elitist upward path through the academic track and a separate competitive vocational upward 
track  
- a relative small, but expanding higher education sector still dominated by the university, 
and lately complemented by a small and slowly growing Polytechnic sector (FH 
Fachhochschule) 
- a system of teacher education divided by separate institutions for compulsory (and 
vocational) teachers (PH Pädagogische Hochschule under the Ministry of Education, being 
not really part of higher education) and programmes at universities for teachers at academic 
schools 
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- a very fragmented and scattered patchwork of a governance system with the school part 
being governed (i) by a mix of a state bureaucracy divided to the federal level (Bund) and the 
provincial level (Länder) with a kind of political federalism that gives quite high 
responsibilities to the Länder (and those concerning infrastructure to the communes-
Gemeinden) in the sector of compulsory schools, (ii) the apprenticeship system is governed 
by the social partners and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (enterprise part) and the Ministry 
of Education and the Länder (school part), (iii) pre-primary education is governed by the 
Communes and the Länder. This system creates within the fulltime school sector two basic 
categories of schools, federal schools (Bundesschulen) comprising the whole of academic 
schools (at lower and upper secondary level) and upper secondary vocational schools (part 
of which are also classified tertiary more recently), and Länder schools comprising the 
primary school and the general lower secondary school (Hauptschule und Neue 
Mittelschule). As a result, the lower secondary compulsory school is divided to the two 
different categories, without a clear coordination or even oversight between them. 
Key traditions and persisting conflicts 
Key traditions, cultures and values in Austrian education can be identified by the following 
aspects: first, despite the formal separation of state and religion a Roman-Catholic tradition 
based on the historic victory of the counter-reformation against the enlightenment is still 
prevalent, which includes the concordat with the Vatican about the support of Catholic 
private schools, meaning that their teachers are paid publicly; second, the tradition of 
apprenticeship in vocational education, related to the sector of small enterprises and their 
strong interest representation through the chambers and reflected in the Trade Regulation 
(‘Gewerbeordnung’), has been successfully carried on through the various ages and regimes 
and is still lively today; third the perception and treatment of education as a strongly 
politicised and conflictual issue prevails in particular since the interwar period (often referred 
to a dictum by the baroque emperor Maria Theresia ‘die Schule ist ein Politicum’), and 
mainly reflected in a conflict between Elite-reproduction and Democratisation that leads to a 
trapped dilemma between holding to the traditional 10-18years Gymnasium and the attempts 
to alleviate the problems of very early tracking at age 10; fourth that tradition of public 
servants as a significant social category related to the tradition of the corporatist welfare 
state mainly established in the difficult period immediately after the first world war and the 
dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. These old historic traditions still lead to quite severe und 
seemingly unresolvable concrete issues today. 
First the old trade-off between achievement and equality/equity is still guiding the political 
developments and discourses, in particular concerning the early tracking at the lower 
secondary level; the – partly hostile – disputes related to this topic are reaching deep into the 
everyday practices, and are binding much energy which could be otherwise used for 
improvement; the strong cultural traditions also preclude to some extent the use of research 
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and evidence for improvement, as ideological beliefs remain stronger than their questioning 
by evidence. 
Second the strong emphasis on vocational education, which includes not only 
apprenticeship, but also a strong full-time vocational school sector, seems to compensate 
quite substantially for the structural threats to equity in compulsory schooling; this sector is 
also somehow separate from the mainstream political conflicts and protected by social 
partnership. 
The public servant tradition seems to guide much of the basic logic of the discourses around 
financing education. The virtual combination of this tradition with corporatism and the tight 
embeddedness of the interest representation into the governance of the public sector 
constitutes to some extent taboos concerning the professionalization of the teachers. The 
strong logic of Trade Unionism, and the negotiations about every small point of  interest 
representation prevails over professional organisation and issues of professional 
development (this can be seen by looking at the publication organs for teachers, which 
include to a high degree the complicated points of negotiations, which are difficult to 
understand from outside). 
Because of the politicised notion of education in Austria there is also a strong tendency with 
the reporting of the media, however, to blow air into each small oven of conflict, thus creating 
a field of discontent, and strengthening the conflictual climate, and increasing unrealistic 
expectations, instead of backing the discourses by increasing information and knowledge. 
Distributional federalism as political context 
Austrian Federalism has a specific shape which might be called ‘distributional federalism’, as 
most of the taxes (about 90%) are collected at the federal level, and then redistributed to the 
provinces and the communes partly according to specified responsibilities, or through a 
basic negotiated redistribution mechanism (‘Finanzausgleich’) which currently concerns a 
remarkable sum of about EURO 80 billion (the agreements according to this redistribution 
constitute a kind of ‘automatic’ entitlement of the Länder and Gemeinden to receive a certain 
amount of the federal taxes, currently 21% for Länder and 12% for Gemeinden).1  Because 
of the complex allocation of responsibilities among the different levels to education these 
structures of Austrian federalism are a very important element of educational financing. 
                                                     
1 The Austrian federalism must not be confused with the Swiss one, as the Swiss cantons collect most of the taxes 
for their expenditure; and Austrian federalism is also not comparable with the German one in its organisational 
consequences, because German Länder are as big or bigger than the whole of Austria, which means that in terms 
of scale the Länder responsibilities in Germany would be the equivalent to the central responsibilities in Austria (in 
terms of distance to the schools or the local entities). These differences are often confused in the Austrian debates. 
If the distribution of responsibilities for school among governmental level is compared, the share of the Länder level 
is similar only to very much bigger countries as Germany, Spain, Italy (see Lassnigg, forthcoming 2015). 
Lassnigg, Lorenz (forthc.2015) Education as a hostage of politics: Sources and dynamics of complexity in a 
bureaucratic-federalist system. Paper to OECD GCES-Governing Complex Education Systems-project. 
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Currently attempts are made to change the basic mechanisms of redistribution, and in 
addition the regulations about the financial governance of the Länder and Gemeinden are 
changing from a cameralistic system to the standards of double accounting. According to 
these current structures it is difficult in several aspects to get an accurate overview about the 
use of resources, which are federal by their origin. As will be shown this structure implies a 
fundamental split between the financing bodies and the spending bodies, in particular with 
the teachers in compulsory schools. An important point of current discussion is to shift a 
more substantial part of the collection of taxes from the federal level to the Länder level, 
which would bring more congruence between financing and spending responsibilities; 
however, there are also proposals to make this split even deeper, by shifting more of 
spending responsibilities to the Länder within the current federal taxing regime. 
From an institutionalist point of view an important element of political power at a certain level 
of governance is how much can be spent for personnel as a key group of clientele. This can 
be emphasized in particular in the corporatist welfare model, where the state employees 
constitute an important asset in the definition and functioning of the model. In this respect the 
Länder have a specific position in the Austrian structure, as the proportion of wages in the 
overall expenditure after transfers is much higher at the Länder level than at each other level 
(39%), and moreover, the wage expenditure of the Länder is about double of the tax 
revenues collected at this level before transfers. This means that the federal level pays for 
half of a main power source of the Länder. As a comparison the communes spend a lower 
proportion for wages (34%), and they also ‘earn’ about 80% of wages paid by collecting their 
taxes (but even at this level 20% of the employees are paid from the central level). 
 
Table 1: Expenditure for wages at different government levels, related to 
transfers  
Mio.EUR Gov total Federal Länder Communes 
Social 
Security 
Gross wages 28.383,8 11.478,3 8.595,2 6.739,7 1.570,6 
Social contribution employer  4.521,1 1.565,2 1.286,4 1.410,7 258,8 
Imputed social contributions employer 1.892,6 778,2 635,7 428,2 50,5 
Sum wages gross employer costs 34.797,5 13.821,7 10.517,3 8.578,6 1.879,9 
Distribution % 100% 40% 30% 25% 5% 
Expenditure after intergov. transfers 171.937,4 67.805,6 26.676,2 25.292,0 52.163,6 
% wages of expenditure after transfers 20% 20% 39% 34% 4% 
Tax revenue before intergov transfers 164.019,6 106.631,6 5.327,1 10.802,0 41.260,3 
% wages of revenue before transfers 21% 13% 197% 79% 5% 
Source: own calculation based on STATISTIK AUSTRIA, STATcube 
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Figure 1: Amount of intergovernmental Redistribution 2014 
 
 
Source: Own figure and calculation based on STATISTICS AUSTRIA Stat-CUBE 
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Figure 1 illustrates the orders of magnitude of fiscal redistribution. The federal level raises 87 
per cent of taxes, and after redistribution the proportion of the Länder and Gemeinden rises 
from 13% of overall state tax revenues to 43% of state expenditure. The Länder are the 
biggest winner of this redistribution, as the share of federal money among their expenditure 
is about 80%.  
Some descriptive aspects 
Social partnership – small state corporatism 
Austria is among the countries with a high degree of participation of the representative 
organisations of employers and employees in policy making and governance (see Graf, 
Lassnigg, and Powell 2011 for a basic description).2 This corporatist structure works mainly 
through informal channels, and has its basis in the system of industrial relations. The 
organisations of Austrian social partnership3 have a strong – even constitutional – 
foundation, in particular the chambers of employers (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich-WKO,4 
and regional branches) and employees (Österreichischer Arbeiterkammertag-AK, and 
regional branches)5 are a specific construction comprising mandatory membership. As a part 
of the federalist system the chambers are organised at the Länder level, and the federal 
branches work as a kind of peak organisation of the Länder chambers; the WKO is also 
basically organised on a sector or branch level, with a very complex overall construction. The 
trade unions are organised by industrial sectors, and partly by occupational groups (white 
collar workers – Privatangestellte-GPA;6 public employees – öffentlich Bedienstete-GOED),7 
and the Länder are also an important organisational level. Within the Union of Public 
Services seven (out of 26) representative groups (Bundesvertretungen)8 at the federal level 
are concerned with sectors/occupations in the education system, corresponding to an 
extremely complex system of service regulations (Dienstrecht) and related collective 
agreements.9  
The Austrian practice of mandatory membership is conflicting to the European practices of 
the social dialogue, as mandatory organisations cannot take part in the European system, 
meaning that the chambers are excluded from the European level, and the non-mandatory 
                                                     
2 Graf, Lukas ; Lassnigg, Lorenz ; Powell, Justin J.W (2011), Austrian Corporatism and Institutional Change in the 
Relationship between Apprenticeship Training and School-based VET, in: Busemeyer, Marius R.; Trampusch, 
Christine  (eds.), The Political Economy of Collective Skill Formation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 150-178. 
3 See http://www.sozialpartner.at/ 
4 See https://www.wko.at/Content.Node/wir/Austrian_Economic_Chambers_Home.html 
5 See http://www.arbeiterkammer.at/The_Chamber_of_Labour.html 
6 See http://www.gpa-djp.at/cs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1342541888234&n=A03_3.1.2.1&pagename=A03%2Findex 
7 See http://goed.at/english/ 
8 See http://goed.at/ueber-uns/organigramm/bundesvertretungen/ 
9 For an overview see the information at the Ministry’s website about teachers’ service regulations 
(LehrerInnendienstrecht) https://www.bmbf.gv.at/schulen/lehrdr/index.html and at the Chancellery’s website about 
wages/collective agreements at the central/federal level that is also applicable to the teachers at Länder level 
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/moderner_arbeitgeber/start_im_bundesdienst/gehaltstabellen.html 
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Federation of Austrian Industries (Industriellenvereinigung-IV)10 and the Trade Unions 
(Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund-ÖGB)11 have gained weight at this level. 
The social partners are basically entitled to comment on new laws, and they have made a 
comprehensive proposal for a reform of education in 2007 (Beirat 2007).12 One of the main 
charges has been a comprehensive reform of school governance, including federal service 
regulation, school autonomy, and educational standards.  
„Bis 2010 soll eine umfassende Reform der Schulverwaltung auf Schiene 
gebracht werden (z.B. bundeseinheitliches LehrerInnendienstrecht, umfassende 
Schulautonomie und Qualitätssicherung durch externe Überprüfung von 
Bildungsstandards)“. (Beirat 2007, 3) 
To some extent these charges have been satisfied up to now.  
Complex regional governance structures 
The procedural features of educational governance in the bureaucratic-federalist system 
were outlined above. It must be taken into account also that the administrative structures at 
the different levels are also providing specific challenges (see ANNEX 1 for illustrations 
about the basic structure of the Austrian governance system in a comparative view).  
First, the number of nine provinces with the high degree of political discretion and 
representation is quite high and untypical for such a small country in comparative terms. 
Beside the metropolitan region of Vienna, three Länder are relatively big with more than one 
Mio. Inhabitants, three are medium size (below 500 T. inhabitants), and two are very small. 
The bigger ones include also some stronger urbanised regions around their capital, so they 
are quite mixed concerning their local conditions.  
Second, the number of almost 2.400 municipalities (see Table 3) is excessively high in 
comparative terms, leading to many very small units which are quite weak in terms of 
resources and competences (e.g. there are even exemptions negotiated from the new rules 
of double accounting for small communes, and they are also exempted from the controlling 
procedures by the Austrian Court of Accounting). The municipalities comprise elected bodies 
(Gemeinderäte). 
Third, the medium level administrative units (counties-Bezirke, 80 more rural counties and 15 
towns) are organised differently as they are rather administrative units (without elected 
                                                     
10 See http://www.iv-net.at/bm50 
11 See http://www.oegb.at/cms/S06/S06_11/english 
12 BEIRAT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND SOZIALFRAGEN (2007) CHANCE BILDUNG. Konzepte der 
österreichischen Sozialpartner zum lebensbegleitenden Lernen als Beitrag zur Lissabon-Strategie. (Oktober). Bad 
Ischl. http://www.sozialpartner.at/sozialpartner/ChanceBildung_20071003.pdf 
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bodies; in the towns the Gemeinderat is elected). This Bezirk-level is less involved in the 
political competition. 
Table 2: Stylised estimations on communes, schools* and average class sizes 
(grossly rounded for overview)  
Level of education Number of schools 
Primary 3100 
Lower secondary (common track)  1500 
Lower secondary academic track 300 
Upper secondary post-compulsory academic and vocational schools 1100 
Total 6000 
  
Level of education Share of communes 
Primary only 50% 
Primary + lower secondary (common track) 25% 
Mixed school structure (types from primary to upper secondary) 15% 
No school 10% 
  
Level of education School size (students) 
Primary 110 
Lower secondary (common track) 150 
Lower secondary (academic track) 400 
Upper secondary 270 
  
Class size in primary education 
Average number of 
students per class 
(Index overall=100) 
Overall 18.4 (100) 
Länder (except Vienna) 17.7 (96) 
Länder capitals/biggest cities 19.3 (105) 
Vienna 21.8 (118) 
Small schools (< 4 classes) 16.4 (89) 
* The concept of ‘school’ used here denotes school sites (Schulstandorte), which can include more than one school 
as an organisational unit, or classes from different school types; such combinations are widespread at the 
lower secondary level because of the reorganisation from Hauptschule to Neue Mittelschule; at the upper 
secondary level more than one vocational schools is often situated at the same site; the size of vocational 
schools varies between 600 and less than 100; the separation of the lower and upper levels of the academic 
track schools is artificial, as they are mostly combined in one school site, their average size is almost 600.  
Source: own calculation, see also Lassnigg 2015 forthc. 
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Table 3: Proportion of small communes (up to 1.000 inhabitants) in Austria (No. communes, inhabitants, and population per 
commune) 
 
communes 
  
population 
  
pop/commune 
 
 total 
in city 
surroundings in countryside total 
in city 
surroundings in countryside total 
in city 
surroundings in countryside 
1000-2000 829 249 580 1.199.613 362.648 836.965 1.447 1.456 1.443 
500-1000 436 101 335 331.011 78.581 252.430 759 778 754 
below 500 190 27 163 64.178 9.091 55.087 338 337 338 
small communes 1.455 377 1.078 1.594.802 450.320 1.144.482 1.096 1.194 1.062 
Total 2.354 811 1.543 8.507.786 5.584.169 2.923.617 3.614 6.886 1.895 
          
% row 100% 34% 66% 100% 66% 34% 
   
         
   
 
% column 
  
% column 
  
index (total =1.00) 
 1000-2000 35% 31% 38% 14% 6% 29% 1,00 1,01 1,00 
500-1000 19% 12% 22% 4% 1% 9% 1,00 1,02 0,99 
below 500 8% 3% 11% 1% 0% 2% 1,00 1,00 1,00 
small communes 62% 46% 70% 19% 8% 39% 1,00 1,09 0,97 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1,00 1,91 0,52 
Source: own calculations based on STATISTCS AUSTRIA 
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When it comes to education, the communes are responsible for the infrastructure of 
compulsory schools, and for pre-primary education also (Kindergärten; here the Länder 
provide additional infrastructure). Table 2 gives some stylised information about the 
distribution of schools among communes. We can see that bigger mixed school systems, 
including upper secondary education are situated in about 15% of communes, and that 
compulsory schools are widely distributed, with about 25% of communes running a primary 
and lower secondary school, and further 50% running only a primary school – those ones will 
be mostly small communes.  
A substantial increase of local or school autonomy would concern the bigger communes in 
post-compulsory upper secondary education, however, very much the smaller communes in 
compulsory, particularly primary education. As the schools are not very much prepared for 
organising their purposes autonomously because of the high degree of regulation and their 
subordinate position, many of the communes will also be poorly prepared for these 
purposes. Therefore careful design of autonomy will be necessary in Austria.  
Strong tradition of civil service under change and reform 
One of the key elements of the corporatist welfare model, to which Austria clearly is 
attached, has historically been a strong and privileged position of the civil servants.  
“Of special importance in this corporatist tradition was the establishment of 
particularly privileged welfare provisions for the civil servants (Beamten). In part, 
this was a means of rewarding loyalty to the state, and in part it was a way of 
demarcating this group’s uniquely exalted social status.” (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 24)  
Despite substantial changes in last decades, the civil servants enjoy generous pensions and 
regulations of employment security, still including protection against mobility. In the last 
decade the share of teachers employed on basis of private employment regulations 
(‘Vertragsbedienstete’) has been substantially increased, in particular with the young newly 
employed teachers. A reform of the service regulation (Dienstrecht) has been amended by 
the end of 2013, which is about to change some of the basic structures of the Austrian 
teaching force, and to simplify much of the existing body of regulation.13 The basic status-
                                                     
13 See the new law http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/BNR/BNR_00001/fname_334508.pdf; the 
complexity of the regulatory framework can be seen fist by the length of 52 pages text, and second by the fact, that 
in order to provide the new regulation, in sum 8 laws had to be changed:  
1 Änderung des Gehaltsgesetzes 1956 
2 Änderung des Vertragsbedienstetengesetzes 1948 
3 Änderung des Bundeslehrer-Lehrverpflichtungsgesetzes 
4 Änderung des Landeslehrer-Dienstrechtsgesetzes 
5 Änderung des Landesvertragslehrpersonengesetzes 1966 
6 Änderung des Land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Landeslehrer-Dienstrechtsgesetzes 
7 Änderung des Land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Landesvertragslehrpersonengesetzes 
8 Aufhebung des Unterrichtspraktikumsgesetzes. 
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difference between Federal and Länder teachers is reduced, by constituting only one type of 
teacher; however, in fact different types are reconstituted by extra allowances for certain 
subjects, levels, and services in addition to a common number of teaching hours. Thus, 
based on different subjects and levels still different groups of teachers will be constituted 
(e.g., a kind of ‘basic teachers’ in primary school and those who give the supplementary 
subjects (Nebenfächer) in upper level schools; upper secondary teachers in supplementary 
subjects get allowances of some 6% more in the beginning of their career than basic 
teachers; teachers in primary subjects (Schularbeitsfächern) receive some 12-14% more, 
with still a difference of 25% in the allowance per teacher-hour for upper secondary as 
compared to lower secondary teaching (30 EUR vs. 24 EUR), so the worth of teaching 
increases upstream. The basic structure of remuneration is still based on the number of 
teaching hours, and has even been changed back to this structure for the Länder teachers 
which had been structured on the basis of a model of annual working hours before – this 
return to the previous structure of teaching hours plus various allowances has also been 
criticised by academic experts. As the teacher unions have objected this model, it can be 
easily imagined that the reformed simplified model might work as a starting point for several 
new rounds of additional allowances.  
An important fact is that the reform will be gradually implemented. The implementation of the 
reform will start for all newly beginning teachers not before 2019, as the unions have 
negotiated a period of five years (2014-19) during which the new teachers may decide 
between the old and the new scheme. This gradual process will lead to a period of up to forty 
years, until the reform will be fully implemented, and the stock of teachers will be renewed 
(Figure 2).  
The figures show the long term development of the teaching force, and their quantitative 
relation to the students, with a substantial increase of teachers’ numbers during the 1970s, 
which are grossly going into retirement during the current decade. The Figure 2a shows that 
student numbers oscillate by +/-10-15% along a quite horizontal path, however, the teachers’ 
numbers have substantially increased, in particular during the 1970s, and have levelled off in 
the 1990s. In the long term since the 1920s the student/teacher-ratio has been reduced by 
60%, with a major part of this reduction during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Substantial parts of the teaching force are of higher age (50% of male teachers above 50 
years, 75% of female teachers above 40years). The combination of the steep wage profile of 
the existing stock and the increase of wages of young teachers will substantially increase the 
expenditure for teachers during the upcoming decades.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
A quick look easily shows that this regulation is only understandable for specialists, who are familiar with the whole 
body of these regulations. 
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Figure 2: Students, teachers, retiring teachers 
a) Long term development of teachers and student numbers, and S/T-ratio (2010=100) 
 
Source: own calculation based on STATISTICS AUSTRIA 
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b) Age profile of teachers 2010/11 
 
Source: modified from NBB 2012 Vol.1, B4a 
c) Stylized course of renewal of the teachers‘ stock depending on the duration of 
careers 2010-50, and projected retirement 2010-19. 
 
Source: own construction and picture, Austria 2050-project  
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c) Retiring teachers 
 
Source: own calculations based on NBB 2012 Vol.1, B4b 
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Industrial relations and school partnership 
A key element of the financing of education in Austria is the system of industrial relations, 
including the service regulation on the one hand and the structures and practices of 
collective agreements in this field. Both systems are negotiated between the state 
representatives and the trade unions. Over decades a very complex and differentiated 
‘quasi-taylorist’ system of collective agreements has evolved which has been based on 
several elements which constitute the salary of teaching personnel. Basically every major 
change in working conditions virtually increased the elements to be paid, and thus would 
have needed increases in salaries. This basic logic constitutes a linkage between education 
practices and salaries that transform every major reform into an issue of the material interest 
based negotiations, and have already hampered attempts of curriculum reform or reforms of 
the governance structures. The reform of the industrial relations regulations (‘Dienstrecht’) 
has simplified the structures; however, the basic logic was not changed. 
A common contention in the education policy discourses is a rhetorical extension of the 
social partnership system that governs the private market based industrial relations, to the 
public service, which is basically based on other principles. The differentiated structure of 
Austrian education combined with federalism also leads to a very differentiated structure of 
the trade union as employees’ representative, thus in effect the politically accountable public 
employer sits vis-à-vis a quite high number of specialist employees’ representatives.  
Since the attempts to increase democratisation and co-determination in the 1970s a 
comprehensive system of school partnership has been established that includes parents’ 
and students’ representatives. According to the strong legalistic tradition the achievement 
regulations give opportunities to question the teachers’ decisions for parents and students, 
which might contribute to the significant difference between grades and tested achievement 
in Austrian schools. 
(In)-Transparency and attempts for governance reforms  
The quite detailed financial reporting system does not provide a clear account of the uses of 
educational expenditure, and the more recent changes in expenditure cannot be clearly 
estimated because of quite substantial changes of the used categories in 2011 (see the 
illustration in ANNEX 2). In the short term the changes of reporting and statistical categories 
make empirical comparisons over time difficult, and in the longer term the changed reporting 
structure still leaves essential aspects under cover so that transparency has been improved 
to some extent, however, not enough. Figure 3b illustrates the haziness of categories, e.g., 
between the personnel and other expenditure, between the operative and the steering 
expenditure (some subsidies have been shifted from the steering category to the operative 
category, and the administration expenditure is also not clearly transparent), as well as 
between compulsory education at primary and lower secondary level and academic school 
that spans lower and upper secondary education.  
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Figure 3: Expenditure for education and change 2009-13 in detailed categories 
a) relative (% of education, % change)   
 
Source: own calculation based on financial statistics 
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b) absolute change 2009-13 
 
Source: own calculation based on financial statistics 
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- reducing administrative tasks of teaching personnel and substituting by administrative 
personnel;  
- improvement of management and controlling educational goals at school level;  
- cooperation between different school sectors.  
Some proposals concern fundamental aspects of planning and steering:  
- to develop adequate information for steering in compulsory schools; evaluation of the 
shape of catchment areas (Schulsprengel);  
- evaluation of the controlling of the financing of teachers of Länder by the federal level 
(conditions of recharging money);  
- abolishing political influence with selection of principals at the Länder level. 
Attempts have been made to improve the knowledge and evidence about education by the 
creation of a state institute for educational R&D (BIFIE).14 
Stratification vs. equity 
As outlined before, the emphasis on the achievement-equity trade-off must be seen as a 
generic element of education politics and policies in Austria. This is reflected in the early 
differentiation at lower secondary level between an academic track (AHS) and a general 
track (Hauptschule, now transformed into Neue Mittelschule). As the differentiation takes 
place already at age 10, it has repercussions into primary school, where parents and 
teachers already are inclined to prepare students for the choice situation. The emphasis on 
the trade-off is reflected in periodically recurring political conflicts and a basic dilemma, as on 
the one hand there is wide consensus that the choice is too early, but as the academic track 
is sacrosanct for broad and influential groups on the other hand, there is no solution for the 
early choice.  
A way out is sought for since decades, to relatively improve the general track, and the 
opportunities it provides, which has been to some extent successful. However, focus on the 
overall ‘less achieving’ general track causes questions and resistance among the 
protagonists of the academic track which feel treated ‘inequitable’ from their perspective. The 
complex and contradictory setting is to some extent also reflected in the practices within 
schools that compromise achievement for not destroying formal opportunities of students, 
which can be seen in strong differences between grades and test results. A substantial group 
of low achievers according to the international LSAs is also one result of the structures. More 
                                                     
14 See https://www.bifie.at/ 
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recent PIAAC analyses indicate also interestingly, that the Austrian ‘high achievers’ (upper 
95% percentile) show a comparative low achievement compared to the average of 
participating countries, whereas the ‘low achievers’ (lower 5% percentile) show a 
comparative high achievement (Lassnigg & Vogtenhuber 2014).15  According to these results 
the inequitable structure of the Austrian system seems to provide also quite substantial 
compensatory mechanisms. 
The strong system of vocational education itself reproduces the tracked structure, as it 
comprises the different levels of medium and upper schools, and apprenticeship which has 
been historically treated as the lowest level. At the same time vocational education at the 
upper secondary level is also compensating for the inequities in lower secondary education, 
by providing comparatively wide access to qualifications, and also real opportunities of 
progression into higher education through the upper level vocational colleges which are 
widely accessed from the lower secondary general schools. So vocational education clearly 
cannot be seen as depriving opportunities in Austria, but rather has a mixed standing 
concerning equity, as it provides opportunities for progression, however, in a very selective 
way compared to AHS, and by providing a wide range of achievement levels in vocational 
education. Transfer into vocational education occurs at ages 14 or 15 which also means 
early choice, and does in the mainstream not provide improvement of general education for 
the young people with low basic competences. Compensatory opportunities are rather 
provided by a separate system financed and organised by labour market policy. 
More recently the issues of equity have been more substantially discussed in a chapter of 
the Austrian Education Report 2012. However, these more elaborate proposals have to date 
not much influenced the wider political disputes.  
Whereas the above described Neue Mittelschule is a kind of systemic approach to improve 
equity, relevant policies targeting specific student groups also exist for students with special 
education needs (SEN), students with difficulties in German language, mainly migrants, and 
in particular also for disadvantaged young people with problems of transition into the labour 
market or to post-compulsory education, in particular apprenticeship. The latter policies have 
been mostly developed as curative measures in labour market policy, and have more 
currently been started to be linked to more preventive strategies in the education system 
also. Concerning SEN quite progressive steps towards integrative policies have been taken 
some decades ago; however, the separate system of special schools has also been 
retained. Concerning children of migrants it took a long time until the necessity of their 
adequate education and support has been recognized as an urgent policy issue. Only when 
the proportions of migrants had already grown substantially, it proved more difficult to 
develop adequate strategies.   
                                                     
15 Lassnigg, Lorenz; Vogtenhuber, Stefan (2014), Das österreichische Modell der Formation von Kompetenzen im 
Vergleich, in: Statistik Austria (Hrsg.), Schlüsselkompetenzen von Erwachsenen – Vertiefende Analysen der PIAAC-
Erhebung 2011/12, Statistik Austria, Wien, S. 49-79. 
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Challenges for education policy and governance 
Main challenges in Austrian schools 
Since the participation in the LSAs in the late 1990s and early 2000s (first TIMSS, then 
PISA) a wide consensus exists that the discrepancy between the relatively high expenditure 
for education on the one hand, and the only average achievement on the other, including a 
quite large group of students with too low competencies, particularly in reading, poses a 
main overarching challenge for the Austrian school system. Measures tried for curing this 
discrepancy so far have not brought improvement measured by PISA (OECD-PISA-
database, Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber p.244-245, see ANNEX 3).16 Another main challenge, 
based on the demographic development, is clearly to find adequate educational strategies 
for the needs of migrant children, whose proportion has grown to around half of all children in 
compulsory education in the densely populated regions, being also concentrated in schools 
of certain areas. A third challenge is the high rate of social reproduction, in particular due to 
the parents’ educational status, which multiplies the likelihood of successful educational 
careers for children of highly educated parents (this somehow contrasting to the 
comparatively low inequality in the society, in particular if measured after transfers (EU DG-
Empl 2011).17 A fourth challenge has come up recently by the imperative of reducing the 
deficit of the public households taken from the EU level, which includes an increased 
emphasis on the assessment of the total public financing and the full inclusion of federal, 
Länder, and Gemeinde budgets and stronger restrictions for ‘outsourcing’ public financing to 
separate bodies. This challenge is increased by serious problems caused by a regional 
bank, and the liabilities taken by the respective provincial government which go into levels of 
billions of EUROS.   
Challenge (i): discrepancy between high expenditure and moderate results 
Conventionally the first challenge can be treated by either improving achievement or by 
reducing expenditure, with evidence pointing rather to the second way as being more 
successful than the first. The Austrian way of solution has grossly been a third way that is to 
increase expenditure and hope for improvement. The Neue Mittelschule reform was the main 
vehicle for this, with the key element of the reform being an increase of the teaching 
intensity/personnel for students in this new track, and to mix the different kinds of teachers. 
This reform was devised and implemented in a more or less voluntaristic way, taking quick 
political decisions, and giving only very rough cornerstones for change. However, it was 
accepted at the political level, and substantial additional resources were provided by the 
government, and – more or less independently from the ideological positions to the step 
towards ‘comprehensiveness’ – welcomed by the Länder who were mainly responsible for 
                                                     
16 OECD, PISA 2012 Database, Table I.2.3b. 
17 EC DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (2011). Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2011. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7294&langId=en 
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implementation. At the basis of this move were, and still are, disputes among the main 
stakeholders about the facts related to achievement as well as about the factors constituting 
them.  
− One the one side of the challenge, the weak performance expressed by the 
LSAs has been taken up by the stakeholders outside school, by policy makers 
and the social partners, but not by the actors inside school. In particular the 
teachers unions, supported by some groups in the academic community express 
doubts of several kinds about the accuracy and feasibility of PISA, trying to 
isolate the proponents of ‘evidence based’ improvement attempts.18   
−  On the other side of the challenge the high expenditure is also put under 
scrutiny, by several arguments claiming the need for more resources, due to the 
several changes in society and families, including migration, which would make 
teaching more difficult. In the early 2000s in particular the Social Democrats 
have taken education, and in particular the reduction of the class size, as one of 
the main points of their election campaign. 
As a result, both sides of the challenge, weak achievement and high expenditure were under 
ideological disputes, which hampered a shared definition of the situation (facts), and 
consequently also a serious search for the reasons for the disputed facts. So until now 
neither the reasons for the weak achievement, nor the factors contributing to the high 
expenditure are sufficiently clear.  
The challenge for the current report is to bring together the available knowledge and to add 
to them as far as possible, based on available information. This includes providing a clear 
account of the available resources, their distribution, and the mechanisms that might hamper 
effectiveness and efficiency. On the side of achievement, we have to take the available 
knowledge, taking into account that there are some puzzles in the available results, first 
differences between assessments (e.g., PISA and PIAAC) and domains; second shifts of 
results between assessments in time (e.g., proportion of consistently low achieving students) 
– however, the performance near the average, and a weak improvement over time can be 
taken as evidence.  
Challenge (ii): Needs resulting from migration 
The second challenge, opportunities for migrants, is clear from the quantitative scale, as 
immigration will be a main factor reducing demographic decline of young people in the future 
(IHS-WIFO 2013; ANNEX 4),19 and must be urgently seen as a resource, and not as a 
                                                     
18 One of the early publications expressing hostility against PISA were edited by Austrian academics, and a quite 
influential philosopher is – embedded in a wider German network – campaigning against the overall strategy of 
measuring competences and related policy strategies for improvement. 
19 IHS-WIFO (2013) Analyse der Datengrundlage zum künftigen Qualifikationsangebot und –bedarf in Österreich. 
IHS-research report (April). Vienna: IHS. http://www.equi.at/dateien/data-ihsrep-ak.pdf 
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‘problem’. To some part this challenge is related to resource allocation, however, according 
to recent research the main aspect of this challenge is related to the development of 
adequate pedagogy (main topic of NBB 2012). The political expectations are also strongly 
related to resources, and the development of strategies is hampered by disputes over 
separation of migrant children into specially treated groups vs. consequent integrative 
strategies. Issues concerning resources are compulsory and free provision of pre-primary 
education, resources for needed additional support to students, and resources needed for 
school development and teacher education to improve pedagogy, including in particular 
continuing teacher education. 
Challenge (iii): Social reproduction  
The third challenge, social reproduction, seems to some part ‘inversely’ related to resources, 
as the public resources do not go un-proportionally high to the academic school, rather the 
opposite. Here the complex selection mechanisms seem to play the strongest role, as the 
results of the school types at different levels are influenced by the resources which the 
students from advanced social background bring to the schools (Lassnigg Vogtenhuber 
2009).20 A comparison of the level and development of resources grossly shows that the 
lower level of the academic school is driven by ‘massification’, compared to the general 
school, and that the compensatory vocational schools did not receive such expansionary 
resources as the general schools. If the results by Daniele Checchi (2006)21 about the 
different governance and structural factors are considered, the dimensions of public/private 
and centralised/decentralised financing are interacting with the differentiation and 
decentralisation of school systems. Centralised public funding can to some degree 
compensate for tracking structures and lack of ‘comprehensiveness’, as privately funded 
decentralised comprehensive structures do not provide better results in terms of equity than 
centralised public tracked structures. This argument and modelling might provide a fruitful 
approach for the understanding of the Austrian disputes about governance and ‘school 
autonomy’. ‘School autonomy’ has been forcefully brought unto the agenda in the 1990s 
from the research level, originally supported by the Industriellenvereinigung however, has not 
been well received by the actors, and is quite heavily disputed until today. 
Challenge (iv) current and future budget constraints 
Concerning the fourth challenge a financial path of the overall budget has been given, and is 
yearly updated by the Ministry of Finance, approved by the government, that sets targets for 
the individual ministries. In education the path has been flattened substantially against the 
previous periods, when every year substantial additional funds have been negotiated and 
provided, and in the short run implies quite substantial cuts. As by far most of the money 
                                                     
20 Lassnigg, Lorenz; Vogtenhuber, Stefan (2009), Governance-Faktoren, Schülerleistungen und Selektivität der 
Schulen, in: Schreiner, Claudia; Schwantner, Ursula (Hrsg.), PISA 2006. Österreichischer Expertenbericht zum 
Naturwissenschafts-Schwerpunkt, Leykam, Graz, S. 376-386. https://www.bifie.at/buch/815/9/5 
21 Checchi, D. (2006): The Economics of Education. Human Capital, Family Background and Inequality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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goes into the personnel costs, there is very little room left for manoeuvre to reduce 
expenditure, and a main proposal is to increase the number of teaching hours by teachers. 
This proposal has been already made and taken back in the past, so at the time of writing it 
cannot be said whether it will be successful this time, and which kinds of conflicts it might 
provoke. 
Even if the provision of resources would have been not very efficient in the recent past, and 
efficiency could probably be increased by a saving of resources it is questionable whether 
this kind of unplanned stop-go politics will provide real improvement, in particular in the 
sketched Austrian environment.  
Relations of the main challenges for education to governance and 
financing policies and structures 
The increase or reduction of the expenditure and increase or reduction of class size have 
been and still are perceived as the main benchmarks for the quality of education policy in the 
public, with increase/reduction being valued positively and reduction/increase being valued 
negatively. Consequently these aspects are carefully considered by policy makers. They 
have two important implications: first they are closely related to each other, as the reduction 
of the class size is known as being the most significant driver of costs, and secondly, as 80-
90% of expenditure is built by personnel expenditure, the two benchmarks are closely 
related to the employment of teachers, who have strong interest organisations, and are also 
a quite remarkable number of relatively articulate voters, and can also to some extent play a 
role as opinion leaders or multipliers. From this observation an upward trend of expenditure 
can be expected, which can be empirically verified. Looking at the recent decades, the 
expenditure increased substantially despite already quite high levels, and moreover, each 
period of reducing the increase or cutting of expenditure was accompanied by political 
protest (sometimes even leading to resigning Ministers of Finance) and has often been 
followed by an even higher increase compared to the previous reductions during the 
following years. At this background an expected increase of effectiveness is automatically 
related to an increase of expenditure, and the increase of efficiency is conceptually ruled out 
by the basic framing of the issues. We can observe the strong focus on an increase of 
expenditure not only at the overall level of mainstream political discourses, but also in the 
more specific analyses and proposals for problem solutions, e.g. to improve disadvantaged 
schools the provision of additional money is proposed by socially backed formulae (Bacher 
2015),22 or to improve support of migrant students the focus is also often on additional 
financing. The Austrian Institute of Economic Research in its expertise also basically calls for 
an increase of resources in education, and a shift of resources from other sectors to 
education. 
                                                     
22 Bacher, Johann (2015) Indexbasierte Ressourcenverteilung eine gute Lösung für inklusive Regionen? JKU Institut 
für Soziologie, Linz . Presentation 
http://www.jku.at/soz/content/e94921/e271261/indexbasierteRessourcenverteilungBacherVersion3_ger.pdf 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the ‚expansionary logic‘ of education politics in Austria 
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The bulk of research focusing on efficiency, saying that the increase of resources does not 
automatically lead to improvement, in particular when resources are already high, is more or 
less neglected in Austria. To some extent it is brought into the debate by researchers, 
however, the drive towards the increase of expenditure is so powerful, that these voices are 
not heard. This can be most clearly demonstrated at the case of the Neue Mittelschule 
reform. Here the increase of teaching resources towards double or team teaching in the core 
subjects is the main element of the reform. From research it can be clearly expected that this 
might be a frame for improvement, but cannot work if it is not accompanied by the 
improvement of teaching-learning practices, which cannot be expected to occur 
automatically. Institutional economics expects that because of opportunism an automatic 
improvement will not take place. The evaluation shows, that the core idea for pedagogical 
improvement through the room for individualisation of teaching-learning was only fully 
implemented in a minority of schools during the inception period, as a result the reform did 
not lead to an hoped-for improvement of achievement in Neue Mittelschule, consequently 
the substantial additional resources have even led to a decrease of efficiency. Many 
indications from the quantitative picture given in the statistical volume of the Austrian 
Education report which point to problems with efficiency are more or less neglected in the 
political discourses 
− In comparison to other countries the proportion of educational expenditure to the 
GDP is not at the highest level, however, a much higher ranking of the per/capita 
proportion is indicating that in Austria relatively fewer students are educated ceteris 
paribus by a fairly high expenditure 
− A clear discrepancy has been always shown between comparatively high class sizes 
and comparatively low student-teacher ratios, which indicate that high teaching 
resources ‘disappear’ somewhere before reaching the structures and practices of 
provision. 
An important facto rare the substantially below average teaching hours (contact time of 
teachers) particularly at lower secondary level (but also to some extent at upper secondary 
level), whereas the pupils’ time of instruction is average. Another element in this puzzle might 
be that effective class sizes in terms of student groups taught might in fact be lower than the 
nominal class size because of divisions by subjects, or other kinds of groupings.23 This 
difference cannot be completely displayed because of a lack of sufficient information, and 
would not pose a big problem if the nominal class size would not be a key political 
                                                     
23 In the general secondary schools before Neue Mittelschule the main subjects (mathematics, German, first foreign 
language, mostly English) were taught in ability groups with smaller group sizes compared to the main classes, 
especially in the track with the weakest students. The national assessment for grade 8 in mathematics (2012) 
provides data on the assignment to ability groups and classes. Average “nominal” class size was 19.5. The average 
size of ability groups was 13.3 for the third ability group (low ability), 16.4 for the second ability group. The size of 
the first ability group is 18.3, almost identical to the class size. Taking into account these forms of grouping might 
reduce the overall nominal class size by some 10% to the effective group size in this school type. 
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benchmark. If real effective sizes are in fact smaller, the use of the nominal figures would 
automatically drive expenditure up.  
Following from the above argument, a main question arises, of how this political logic might 
be related to the structures of provision in the educational system, and in particular to the 
governance of the system. A previous study (Lassnigg et al. 2007; see also Lassnigg, Bock-
Schappelwein, Pitlik, Hans 2009)24 has given a comprehensive literature and data based 
analysis of the Austrian system and pointed to several contradictions, incoherencies and 
unresolved problems in basic structures of provision and governance.  
− As a main problem in the structure of provision was identified that in the tracked 
system the differences in the resources which result from the composition of the 
student bodies was neglected in policy and governance. A subsequent study has 
tried to identify the proportion of differences between the school types in different 
tracks that can be traced to the social origin of the students. Attempts to identify how 
the governance at the school level deals with this factor showed rather signs of 
compensatory than aggravating strategies (thus the actors seemed basically to work 
not in line with the selective structure but against it; Lassnigg/Vogtenhuber 2009). 
Considering two contrasting approaches of coping with equity and justice in 
education, one that tries to alleviate the differences in background resources within 
education vs. the one that runs differentiating and elitist strategies in education and 
compensates for inequalities afterwards by redistribution, the Austrian system 
comprises a contradictory mixture, as there seem compensating practices to prevail 
within the elitist structure and institutions. According to the available information at 
the time of writing the previous report (2007) the redistributive mechanisms were 
considered being rather weak, whereas more current information shows a favourable 
position in comparative terms (see EC DG-Empl 2011).  
− The main focus of the study was on the governance and administrative structures, 
and posed as the core argument for the understanding of the structure that the 
basically existing overall classical bureaucratic structure is fundamentally broken at 
the Länder level by the politicised federalism, with the result that the potential 
strength of the rationality of a bureaucracy is broken, and only its weaknesses of 
overregulation and reducing the discretion and responsibility at the bottom level 
come into play, whereas the intervening factor of federalism brings an opportunistic 
politicisation into the system, which also discourages professional practices at the 
bottom level. As a result the actors at the bottom level, the schools, principals and 
teachers are doubly discouraged by the existing governance regimes, which at the 
same time give no room for institutional autonomy of schools and drive teachers into 
                                                     
24 Lassnigg, Lorenz; Bock-Schappelwein, Julia; Pitlik, Hans (2009), Bildungsökonomie: Eine vernachlässigte Quelle 
erweiterten Steuerungswissens im österreichischen Bildungswesen, in: Specht, Werner (Hrsg.), Nationaler 
Bildungsbericht Österreich 2009 , Band 2: Fokussierte Analysen bildungspolitischer Schwerpunktthemen, Leykam, 
Graz, S. 361-379.  
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their lessons where they have full discretion. The schools as actors and cooperation 
among teachers is systematically precluded and discouraged by this structure. The 
combination of state official tradition and social partnership fits into the overall 
structure by establishing an institutional complementarity of the trade unions’ 
strategy towards regulation on the one hand (bureaucracy) and political influence on 
the other (federalism). The shape of industrial relations based on the Dienstrecht and 
collective agreements is the main mechanism of how the teachers’ unions have 
succeeded to gain a main veto point in any major education reform, as very detailed 
systems of regulations governing the employment conditions and payment of 
salaries have been developed incrementally. Based on this system each new major 
responsibility of teachers is defined an additional task to an already full use of 
capacity, and thus should be additionally remunerated. Political activities of teachers 
are guided into these structures – as a consequence the trade unions are also the 
only actor that represents the professional interests, which conflict with the classical 
goals of material interest representation of employees; it must be said also that 
professional organisations are very rudimentary in this context, and the development 
of kinds of more research based activities is tended to be devalued.25  As a 
consequence the Educational Referendum (Bildungsvolksbegehren 2011)26 evolved 
as a kind of professional platform, which however, turned also into a politicised path; 
more recently the Industriellenvereinigung has tried to set up a new platform to 
improve education. 
−  As a result, the conditions for an effective governance system in education proposed 
by economic institutionalism are structurally and politically precluded. If the model by 
Bishop/Wößmann (2001)27 is taken as reference then from eleven criteria three are 
fully present in Austria (attention of teachers to assessment of students; influence of 
teachers on pedagogy; and no influence of schools on their overall budget), and two 
are implemented and heavy counter-fire (partly central final exams in upper level 
academic and vocational schools; central educational standards and control), 
whereas three very important criteria are definitely missed (autonomy of schools in 
process and personnel issues; influence of teachers about amount of their work; and 
not too much influence of trade unions), and the remaining three are not so clear to 
assess (parents’ influence on schools; proportion of private schools for competition; 
medium level administration).  
                                                     
25 In Austrian politics a complete confusion prevails about what research means, and the kind of politicised debates 
can be illustrated by recent statements concerning the Neue Mittelschule (end April 2015). A very serious evaluation 
of their effects on practices and competences is countered by completely superficial data about transitions into the 
academic track which can be interpreted mainly as a selection effect. However these data are used by high level 
politicians to criticise in a very devaluing manner the Federal research institute BIFIE (which, by the way was not 
responsible for the evaluation). 
26 See http://www.nichtsitzenbleiben.at/ 
27 Bishop, John H. and Wößmann, Ludger (2001): Institutional Effects in a Simple Model of Educational Production. 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1085. http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2003/53/pdf/kap1085.pdf 
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Basically all stakeholders support at least rhetorically more autonomy at school level, 
however, to varying degrees. In particular the labour side of the social partners is much more 
reserved than the employers’ side, and a recent political draft proposal by representatives of 
the Länder, the Ministry and the social partners does give the schools rather a rhetorical 
autonomy than one mandated by regulatory changes; a NGO-like movement, based on a 
referendum some years ago (Bildungsvolksbegehren) charges more wide ranging 
responsibilities at the school level. Main issues of debate are the responsibilities about 
personnel management, and how the planning and financing responsibilities should be 
allocated among the authorities, however, a more fully-fledged comprehensive proposal is 
still missing. 
 
Figure 5: Stylized framework for understanding the Austrian governance system 
 
Source: own figure 
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Key issues for developing a better governance system 
The study about the governance structures has finally proposed four key issues which are 
related to the framework for understanding the system, and which should be addressed in 
developing a new more effective and efficient governance system (Lassnigg et al 2007, 
p.188): 
i. Congruent distribution of responsibilities. Resolving the problems of intersecting 
responsibilities among the authority levels, in particular in the direction that a 
definitive congruence between the tasks/duties of governing actors and the 
responsibilities for financing and spending is reached (the actual incongruence that 
the federal level is responsible for financing, whereas the Länder level is responsible 
for spending in the main sector of teachers in compulsory schools, and the duties 
are mixed is seen as a major problem reducing efficiency) 
ii. School autonomy. Designing, regulating and implementing sufficient conditions for 
pedagogic work at the school level based on concepts of school autonomy, by 
providing room for discretion and abandoning the bureaucratic and organisational 
obstacles for work at school (paralleled by the establishment of sufficient monitoring 
achievement) 
iii. Reform of the system of industrial relations. Development of effective structures of 
industrial relations and working conditions in education, in particular reform or 
abandonment of Dienstrecht and shaping of attractive and flexible working 
conditions by changing the inflexible and tayloristic regulations and structures of 
payment of the salaries (devising teachers’ work on the basis of professional 
principles instead as a collection of tayloristic points of effort constituting the salary) 
iv. Comprehensive funding structures according to efficiency and equity. Allocation of 
funding through simplified structures of responsibilities according to specified criteria 
of efficiency and equity, and considering the main challenges for education; a 
comprehensive system must include the Finanzausgleich. 
These issues will be tackled one after the other in the following 
Development issue (i) congruent regulation  
A basic thrust of the regulation at the federal political level was to create self-binding 
mechanisms against a voluntaristic or one-sided change of the basic structures of the 
education system, with a constitutional quorum and interlinked responsibilities between the 
federal and the Länder level.  This system has been set up by a big regulatory endeavour in 
1962 which was negotiated by the then two big coalition parties (Socialist and Christian 
Democrat). In order to ‘resolve’ the big fights from the past about school structures they 
agreed to transform these issues into constitutional law requiring a parliamentary two third 
quorum to change it, in order to secure that one side of the conflict parties cannot change 
the structure towards its own aims and ideas. This solution, however, has not solved the 
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issues but trapped the actors in un-ended conflict without a perspective of a solution. This 
trap might also be interpreted as a de facto mechanism that supports to some part more 
rhetorical than serious discourses, which might build up to overstated discursive conflicts, 
because each party knows in advance that it will not be able to realise its charges.  
In addition to the quorum the interlinkages of the political and administrative levels have 
been fixed, on the background that the provinces and the communes have also been 
embedded into the party political conflict. Historically there has been the significant conflict 
between social democratic ‘red’ Vienna and the conservative rural provinces, which is still 
echoed by quite fundamentally different structures between the two regional types. 
Development issue (ii): school autonomy 
The structural blocking has periodically led to shifts in attention towards “inner school 
reform”, and as a part of such movements school autonomy has become a political issue in 
Austria in the early 1990s. This movement has started with a collaborative research report 
edited by two eminent educational researchers driven from action research. The volume 
discussed conceptual issues and analysed the hindrances at the practice level caused by 
the tight bureaucratic structures (Posch/Altrichter 1993).28 The debate got more or less stuck 
in structural issues, and a kind of duality has emerged between school development at the 
micro level, to some extent promoted by quality models and initiatives, on the one hand, and 
the political debates about ‘providing more autonomy’ to schools on the other (Friedrich 
1993).29 This to some extent heated debate has resulted in only minor amendments that 
could not change the basic structures (Lassnigg, Bock-Schappelwein, Pitlik 2009; Schratz, 
Hartmann 2009).30 An attempt to change the practices at the school level by a new 
curriculum for lower secondary education, which should relate the teachers’ decisions about 
content to strategies of school development (Lehrplan’99) did not succeed at the practice 
level because of the resistance of the trade unions. In the 2000s school autonomy has also 
been strongly related to the political turbulences around right wing populism and been 
discredited as a strategy to ‘outsource’ austerity measures from the political level to the 
school level. 
School autonomy, meaning not only more room for discretion but a change of the distribution 
of responsibilities and of the basic working practices, has become stuck in the complex, 
fragmented and conflict-loaded structures, so a viable and comprehensive strategy has 
never been seriously proposed or discussed up to now. The following dimensions can be 
summarized as the main hindrances for the development of school autonomy in Austria: 
                                                     
28 Posch, Peter, Altrichter, Herbert. Eds. (1993). Schulautonomie in Österreich (2., aktualisierte und erw. Aufl.). 
Bildungsforschung des BMUK, Band 1. Studienverlag, Innsbruck-Wien. 
29 Friedrich, Gerhard (1993) Autonomie der Schule. Ein Organisationsentwicklungskonzept. Band 3 der Reihe 
„Bildungsforschung des BMUK", Studienverlag, Innsbruck-Wien. 
30 Schratz, Michael, Hartmann, Martin (2009) Schulautonomie in Österreich: Bilanz und Perspektiven für eine 
eigenverantwortliche Schule. Nationaler Bildungsbericht Österreich 2009, Band 2. https://www.bifie.at/buch/1024/c/2 
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− The complex distribution of responsibilities with the focus on the distribution between 
the federal and the Länder level 
−  The political-administrative structure with quite big and powerful regions (Länder) 
and the predominantly small and weak communes, without a structure in between 
(the weak institutions at district level have been abolished and transferred upwards 
to the Länder) 
−  The bureaucratic structure that locks teachers into their classrooms, and does not 
provide space and incentives for cooperative and collective strategies at school level 
−  The half-day provision linked to the wide room of discretion by teachers about their 
non-teaching working time which supports an individualized shift of supplementary 
work outside schools 
−  The lack of professionalism with the strong link of interest organisations to the 
material interests and to the preservation of the existing power structures which 
would be substantially changed by a shift of responsibilities to the school level 
−  The wide room for discretion for teachers in the classroom shifts attention to that 
level, and might support a notion that organizational issues are perceived rather as a 
disturbance than a potential resource; the high share of small schools might shift 
much of de facto responsibility to the school level, possibly related to a lack of 
resources for really taking them  
In sum the development of a structure that gives schools as organisations a right degree of 
discretion about their work and performance would need a proper design of the overall 
structure including many problematic and contested issues. The overall acceptance of such 
a shift among the various actors seems quite weak, and a major question is, to which degree 
the new attempts of quality initiatives at the school level will be effective and survive in the 
existing wider structure. Here we have to take into account, that there has already been a 
wave towards micro level school reform in the 1980s, out of which the debate about 
autonomy has originated. It should also be taken into account, that despite much attempts 
an improvement of achievement results could not be achieved so far.  
Development issue (iii): Industrial relations 
The bureaucratic logic of the school system is also given strong expression by the fact that 
teachers were traditionally employed as civil servants (with life-tenure and often permanent 
posts, i.e. the right to stay in a specific school). Only in recent years this has been replaced 
by a contract agent scheme for new teachers entering the system. Teachers are given full 
autonomy with regard to the choice of pedagogical methods they deem appropriate to 
achieve educational targets in curricula, and they also have a very high degree of discretion 
about one third to half of their working time (mostly performed in an individualised way 
outside of the school). 
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A large share of the teachers are organised in trade unions that are powerful stakeholders 
and grouped in political fractions that broadly mirror the political parties in Austria. 
Traditionally, the Austrian teacher unions are led by conservative representatives (Christian 
democrats), with differences in the political preferences between the upper level ‘academic’ 
teachers and the teachers in compulsory schools (thus the ‘politicisation’ reaches into the 
teachers organisations also).  
Regulatory changes by the current reform have been outlined above, with the long term 
gradual implementation period making an assessment of effects very difficult. It was shown, 
that the new regulation contains many invasive points, where the traditional practices might 
prevail, and develop new categorisations of teachers, and negotiate plenty of new kinds of 
allowances on top of the somehow simplified structure.  
The main developmental path would be to establish a new professional layer of practice and 
organisation that would shift the attention towards pedagogical practice in addition to the 
issues of interest negotiations, and would take the political responsibility away from the trade 
unions alone. The basis of this development could be the many existing initiatives for school 
and pedagogic development, which are not commonly organised and are also not visible in 
the common educational discourses. A main threat in this development is the prevailing high 
level of politicisation which tends to absorb professional issues into the existing unproductive 
and polarised patterns of discourse instead of creating and pushing new more productive 
paths of discourses.  
An important asset in this development could be research and evidence, which is quite 
heavily discredited from different sides at the moment, and which also needs substantial 
development in order to show its positive potentials.   
Development issue (iv): putting the fragments of education policy together 
As the communes are responsible for the infrastructure including non-teaching personnel, 
the available resources and the competencies of the communes are an important element of 
the provision of education in Austria. The fragmentation of responsibilities also leads to 
important interfaces between sectors of education which are situated with different 
authorities (the academic and general schools at lower secondary level: if participation in the 
academic track is increased additional resources come in from the central level, without 
changing the communal level, but also power about schooling is redistributed to some 
extent; and the relation between pre-primary and compulsory schools is also affected). The 
availability of resources at the communal level is a very important issue for education which 
is governed through the negotiations about the redistribution of the federal taxes to the 
Länder and Communes.  
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 These negotiations are performed as a separate political activity spanning all the different 
policy fields, setting parameters also for compulsory education as a part of these 
negotiations. As a consequence of this split the different sectors of education at certain 
localities are kept separate, and the planning of infrastructure is not comprehensively 
monitored. The federal level makes its own planning, and the Communes and the Länder 
make their planning for the fragmented localities. An important deficiency is that the school 
types at the lower secondary level are so completely separate that not even simple 
monitoring figures can be found that would give a comprehensive picture of resources at this 
level (in the academic school the students can be assessed separately for the lower and the 
upper cycle, however the teachers and other resources cannot by the given statistics, and 
are consequently not reported. This aspect is important for planning, as the ongoing shift in 
participation from the general school to the academic school means in parallel that additional 
resources come in, without automatically affecting those from the Länder and communes. 
As a result of these governance structures, we cannot find a systematic logic in the structure 
and development of the school facilities. This is reflected in various aspects of the school 
structure (e.g. the distribution of school sizes seem erratic and does not reflect any 
reasonable structure). The current system seems also unable to cope with differences in 
demographic development, as can be demonstrated by the comparison of the population 
and the resources in primary schools. In the Länder except Vienna the 6-9year population 
declined by 15-30 percent 2000-12, whereas the deflated real resources per population for 
primary schools increased by 20-40 per cent in the same period, whereas in the Vienna 
region, where the population increased slightly, the resources remained stable (Figure 6) The 
comparison of the development of these figures gives an erratic picture pointing to the above 
mentioned basic expansionary logic, and being unable to plan and to redistribute between 
Länder, so the development seems to be a combination of (expansionary) incrementalism 
and the inclination to get as much as possible out of the common pool.  
Recent proposals concerning the Finanzausgleich, which must be renegotiated in 2016 
include a closer look at the sector specific demands, however, it seems not easily to imagine 
how this linkage can be provided, given the divergent interests and the basic structures of 
the negotiations.  
Contested evidence and structural deficiencies vis-a-vis systematic 
evidence informed planning and steering 
Since the Austrian participation in the international Large Scale Assessments that started in 
the late 1990s an increasing emphasis on ‘evidence based policy’ has been promoted at the 
federal level. The first participation in TIMSS has led to a substantial project for professional 
development (IMST) which is still in place, whereas in particular with the PISA assessments 
the topic became increasingly politicised and contested. The teacher unions have been 
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basically critical against this movement, and the increasing attempts towards evidence are 
quite separate from the practice level. 
Figure 6: Comparison of demography and resources in primary schools by 
Länder  
6-9y olds and resources for primary school index 2012 = 100; relation resources/age group index 2000=100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on STATISTICS AUSTRIA 
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The existing governance system includes fundamental hindrances for political planning 
according to priorities. The fragmented and interlocking responsibilities among the state and 
non-state actors (trade unions) as well as the basic regulatory structure make the effective 
formulation of political priorities difficult, and diffuse in particular the relationship of priorities 
to the use of resources. As has already been argued a main resulting dynamic in this system 
is the basic trend towards the expansion of the educational budget (i.e. reduction of class 
sizes) which severely counteracts considerations of effectiveness and efficiency. Another 
severe hindrance is still the lack of sufficient information, despite substantial improvements 
in the documentation of the distribution of federal resources as well as the educational 
statistics. The use of resources across the different administrative and political levels is not 
transparent, and the financial information cannot be clearly related to the material statistical 
information about students and teachers, so in several ways it is not obvious to calculate unit 
costs. The statistical volume of the NBB has taken this as an objective, however, the 
conventional classifications, which differ between die financial and the material information 
continuously create difficulties in achieving this task which should be carried on (Lassnigg et 
al. 2007, Lassnigg et al chapter NBB 2009). The breaking of bureaucracy by federalism and 
the lack of autonomy and concentration of resources at the school level also weaken the 
relationship of resource allocation to practice.  
The analysis of regional differences in the development of the various parameters does not 
provide systematic meaningful patterns but rather gives an erratic picture. This is plausible, 
as mechanisms that would clearly channel the resource use towards certain priorities do not 
exist. A basic mechanism that guides the allocation of resources is incrementalism, meaning 
the yearly updating of what has been there already before (substantial redistribution seems 
not possible, even if the parameters would point to such needs, as the different demographic 
developments between Vienna and the other Länder indicate). On the background of this 
incrementalism the existing structure supports the federalist political power play known from 
the bureaucratic logic indicating that every actor tries to maximise his or her resources (this 
might explain that against the basic expansionary trend some Länder have succeeded to 
receive relatively more resources than others.  
Since the late 2000s an overarching priority has been the – knowingly expensive – reduction 
of class sizes that is widely consensual among all groups of actors (except some 
researchers), and fits into the also consensual basic priority of the expansion of educational 
resources as a political value. According to this consensus substantial additional means 
have been provided for these purposes in the federal budget through the last decade, in 
particular for the NMS reform. However, the tight European rules towards the reduction of 
public deficits has currently reversed the trend, and the financial path towards 2018 
demands substantial cuts in parts of educational finance. This means that the priorities set 
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some years ago cannot be carried through, and that the austerity politics will create heavy 
conflicts about resources among the various actors. 
The indicators of wirkungsorientierte Steuerung point to longer term issues which seem 
difficult to arrive in the political logic of incrementalism without the actors devising strategies 
at the practice level to reach the priorities. 
The statistical information for the monitoring of resource use reflects the basic administrative 
and political structures and therefore still includes substantial gaps, in particular concerning 
firstly the relationship between the financial information and the material information, and 
secondly the relationship between financial and substantial information about teachers and 
students. A basic issue is how to include the high proportion of transfers between the levels 
into a consistent monitoring system. Consequently the lower secondary level with the two 
categories of Landes- and Bundesschulen cannot be monitored as a comprehensive entity, 
and also the categories of Landes- and Bundeslehrer cannot be compared easily.31   
Full information about the resources for infrastructure provided by the communes is still not 
completely available, leading to the demand for better information for the steering of 
resources in the compulsory school sector in the current proposals for the Aufgabenreform of 
the state administration. 
Schulversuche have some tradition in Austria since the 1970s, when a kind of experimental 
design has been set up for the development of comprehensive reform. However, these 
approaches have always been flawed, because the academic school could not be included 
into the trials. Moreover, the envisaged reform has been implemented only in the sector of 
the general lower secondary school, mainly introducing setting differentiation by the 
achievement groups in principal subjects. From this time a practice of trials (Schulversuche) 
has been established that is used rather for the purpose of reform, and is not systematically 
controlled. Since the 1980s an approach of school development based on concepts of action 
research has flourished,  leading to some duality between this kind of qualitative micro level 
school development (represented in an exemplary sense by the IMST project),  and more 
formal quantitative approaches which somehow transferred into the LSAs, and then the 
creation of the BIFIE.  
                                                     
31 Until recent changes it was not possible for the federal level to get information about the parameters of the 
employment of the Landeslehrer despite the responsibility to refund the total expenses (Lassnigg, Nemeth 2002). 
Concerning the information about the Landeslehrer see the references of the Rechnungshof given in 
http://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/fileadmin/downloads/2013/beratung/gesetzesbegutachtungen/Stellungnahme_Novell
e_zur_Landeslehrer-Controllingverordnung.pdf 
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Considerations concerning utilisation, distribution and management of 
resources 
In this section the above considerations are a bit more focused and concretised towards the 
governance of different aspects of the allocation and utilisation of resources. The use of 
resources concerns the practice level at schools, the distribution concerns the channels of 
how the resources travel to the school level, and the management concerns the mechanisms 
and practices that might improve both, the use and the distribution of resources.  
Main challenges for the use of resources 
The main challenges of governance in education policy and politics in Austria have been 
outlined in the previous section. Here we can summarize more concretely the challenges for 
the use of resources at the school level. From institutional economics two aspects are 
important to consider: First the constellations-combinations of public-private and centralised-
decentralised funding structures which have complex influences on equity (Checchi 2006), 
second the recommendation that the amount of resources should be determined at a certain 
distance from the school level, however, the use of this (given) amount should be determined 
as much as possible at the school level (Bishop/Wößmann 2001). In Austria most funding is 
provided publicly, in the characterised split of federal and Länder responsibilities. The main 
channel of funding, which in turn is determined at the federal and Länder levels, runs through 
the allocation of the resources for teachers to schools. Even the selection of teachers is not 
under the responsibility of the school. The comparatively smaller proportion of resources for 
infrastructure is determined by the communal and the federal level; for the communal level 
this channel is much influenced by the negotiations about the Finanzausgleich, outside of 
education politics. 
A main challenge is that in this split structure an overview about the use of resources is 
difficult to obtain because of certain significant gaps. First, the information about financing 
has been improved substantially in recent years, but is not transparent enough to interpret 
the given categories in a substantial sense, and the financial information is not clearly linked 
to material categories of provision (for the essential sector of lower secondary education 
comprehensive figures cannot be obtained because the resources of the academic school 
cannot be clearly identified for the lower and upper secondary level). Second, the information 
about teachers cannot be related to the information about students and infrastructure on a 
more disaggregate level, so the resource use at the school level cannot be sufficiently 
identified. Third, the resources used for administration and management cannot be clearly 
identified, because they are to some part embedded into the work of teachers, and the 
responsibilities of the school leaders also include linked responsibilities of administration, 
pedagogy and teaching; so in fact it is not known how much of the resource use is really 
linked to the principal tasks of teaching and learning. Fourth, the tasks of assessment are 
very much regulated in Austria, thus this function can also be expected to make use of a 
substantial amount of resources (relative to the direct support of learning), and besides 
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despite the existing thorough regulations of assessment a clear and substantial discrepancy 
between test results and the teachers’ assessment occurs.  
On this background the available information does not really allow to identify how the 
discrepancy between the relative high expenditure and the rather mediocre test results is 
related to the resource use at the school level. Thus this discrepancy remains to be a source 
of discontent and conflict, which hamper improvement. The basic framing in education 
politics that every problem were due to a lack of resources is systematically flawed because 
the resources are clearly quite superfluous, and in addition have also been substantially 
increased in recent times. It must also be considered that most additional resources have 
directly increased the teaching force, so the argument that teachers are key for success has 
been implicitly taken into account in Austrian politics.  
The relationships between class sizes (CS) and the student-teacher-ratio (STR) have shown 
that a very favourable STR translates into a not so much favourable class size. Here the 
difference between the overall class size and the effective size of instructional groups must 
be taken into account, as the effective class sizes are below the nominal class sizes 
because of the achievement groupings and several regulations about divisions in certain 
subjects. Because of the complex regulatory system, information about the effective class 
sizes is not reported regularly and difficult to obtain.  
The exemplary analysis of the relationship between the demographic development and the 
allocation of resources in the sector of primary schools has shown that the schools in Länder 
with a demographic decline have earned a substantial ‘demographic dividend’ by increasing 
their resources per population in a similar amount to the decline, whereas Vienna had to 
suffer a ‘demographic penalty’, as the favourable demographic development was not related 
to an increase of resources (despite a high amount of demographic change has been 
caused by immigration). This analysis clearly indicates that the mechanisms of resource 
allocation in this sector do not reflect needs, and that the current system does particularly not 
support redistribution of resources according to the needs. 
Proposals to shift more teaching resources away from administration to effective tasks of 
teaching because of specific personnel would cost less salary than teachers can only 
increase efficiency if the teaching workforce is reduced by the respective working hours. 
However, based on the current framework and practice this seems even unthinkable, so it 
can be expected that this shift in reality will increase expenditure, as the administrative 
personnel will be cheaper but employed in addition to the existing teaching force, thus 
improving implicitly the favourable STR even further. 
Summarizing a first main challenge concerning the use of resources at the school level 
would be to provide substantial better information about how the resources are used, and 
where the discrepancy between high expenditure and mediocre results comes from. Before 
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this question is answered more clearly, an increase of resources should not be envisaged in 
any area. Proposals of formula funding to gear more resources to disadvantaged schools 
should consider first how the resources are actually distributed, and should secondly at least 
be based on redistribution rather than on an increase by putting them on top of available 
resources – otherwise there is a serious danger that the additional resources might blow out 
as a seemingly plausible symbolic solution (similar to much of the resources of the NMS).  
Given the overall constellation, a second challenge would be a substantial shift of 
responsibilities to the school level, which would need a very careful design given the many 
hindrances in the given structure. Proposals in this direction are available; however, they 
remain on a much too general level to be effective. In formulating such a solution Austria can 
build on much of the experience of other countries, which have taken measures much time 
before (e.g. the material from the OECD GCES project can be used for this purpose). A main 
question is whether a satisfactory solution would need a shift in the regime, and cannot be 
achieved by incremental changes. The current approaches of improving the professional 
practice (SQA, QIBB, also IMST)32 can be taken as starting points, from which the structural 
needs and hindrances can be analysed, and solutions be developed from the practice level 
rather than from the political level. The use of evidence could be infused more directly into 
practice at this level. 
A basic question concerning this challenge is related to the distribution of responsibilities 
between the federal and the Länder level. An existing proposal by a current high level reform 
commission proposes to shift the responsibilities for provision substantially to the Länder 
level, and to reduce the responsibilities of the federal level to strategic functions. This would 
aggravate the division between financing (still by the federal level) and provision (shifted to 
the Länder level), and would give leeway to the political charge of increased resources as 
solution for each problem, which is very likely given the existing logic. A shift of these 
responsibilities to the Länder can only be successful, if the responsibility of generating the 
resources is also shifted to the Länder level by the right/responsibility of collecting the 
respective taxes. The increased responsibility at the Länder level for implementation would 
also shift the issue of school autonomy to this level, and thus very likely prevent a common 
approach to this main challenge.  
A third challenge is that a reform of the Austrian governance system must be based on a 
clear account of how the existing system works, and what its pitfalls are and how the practice 
can be improved, instead of looking on the complex and complicated distribution of 
responsibilities on paper, and to try to solve these problems on paper rather than on the level 
of practical governance. As proposed in the previous section, the four interrelated 
dimensions (distribution of responsibilities; school autonomy; industrial relations; 
                                                     
32 SQA: Schulqualität Allgemeinbildung =initiative school quality in general education; QIBB: QualitätsInitiative 
BerufsBildung=quality initiative for vocational education and training; IMST-Innovations make schools top. 
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Finanzausgleich) should be taken into account and be brought into a reasonable 
comprehensive structure. 
Main challenges concerning resource distribution 
The main challenge with resource distribution concerns the conditions of allocating the 
resources in a more systematic and comprehensible way according to the needs and 
priorities. The empirical distributions across Länder look erratic and do not give meaningful 
patterns, at more disaggregate levels sufficient information and monitoring is lacking, 
reflected by the charges of the Rechnungshof and the Aufgabenkommission for the 
development of an information base for steering.  
The resource distribution is organised in a fragmented way between administrative political 
levels, with the distinction of the Landes- and the federal schools, employing different 
categories of teachers partly for the same groups of students, and a distinct system of 
allocating the infrastructure. This system makes comprehensive planning impossible, and 
relies on a mixture of incrementalism and political influence. The structure and development 
of school resources appears erratic and does not follow reasonable patterns.  
As different aspects of resources are allocated by distinct mechanisms, and different but 
interrelated sectors and regions follow different rules, the information system about 
resources is also fragmented, and does not allow a comprehensive reporting and 
assessment of resource allocation. 
The divergence of financing and spending between the Länder and the federal level 
constitutes divergent interests and political logics and competition which further reduces the 
rationality of resource allocation. In addition some of the Länder span quite big and mixed 
regions that include similar heterogeneity as Austria as a whole (e.g., between rural and 
urban regions), and thus also include conflicting interests.   
In particular two issues of resource allocation are problematic and contested, first how 
teachers are allocated to schools, and second the allocation of resources for infrastructure 
from outside education politics 
− The allocation of teachers to schools by the authorities beyond them makes on the 
one hand schools dependent and reduces their responsibility, and within the 
structure of politicised federalism makes teachers dependent on the political forces – 
on the other hand the argument is brought forward that the existing structure would 
protect teachers from the arbitrariness of local school heads. Overall the idea of 
school development research that schools are able to manage their own affairs 
successfully is weakly developed in the Austrian environment.  
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−  The separation of the allocation of the means for infrastructure from education 
policies impedes planning and oversight, in particular in the wide area of the small 
and weak communes which receive much less resources than the Länder. This 
highly decentralised field does not provide the necessary data for gaining oversight. 
The Rechnungshof thus demands the development of a sufficient information base 
for steering. Moreover the lack of resources by communes hinders the professional 
development of personnel in pre-primary education, as more highly educated 
personnel is considered being too expensive by the communes. 
A specific issue concerning the failure of planning is the reform of teacher education, which 
has been amended and is implemented in a period when the renewal of the teaching work 
force will already be to a large part processed through the system.  
Proposals of formula funding based on factors of disadvantage have been brought forward 
more recently to channel the resources more directly to the needs. 
The figures in ANNEX 5 show a quite distributed picture without patterns that could be 
reasonably interpreted.33 There are some differences by population structures, however, 
these cannot sufficiently explain the patterns. A comparison of the communes with very small 
primary schools only (up to three classes) to the Länder averages shows quite similar class 
sizes in the small schools to the average. We can see very different relationships between 
class size and student teacher ratios in different Länder in different school types (at given 
class sizes the STR varies by more than 1 up to 4 students/teacher between Länder in given 
school types, that amounts from 10% of the average ratio in primary school through 20% in 
NMS up to 100% in SEN). There are different patterns of Länder across school types with 
some rather consistently showing favourable figures (N), and others rather reverse figures in 
different school types (B, K). A tendency seems to be that the small and medium Länder 
show more specific resource intense patterns than the larger ones; maybe the overall 
amount of resources influences generosity of distribution. 
Main challenges concerning resource management 
The main challenge to resource management is its distributed and fragmented nature based 
on the structure of the overall governance system that splits the different aspects of resource 
management up to various processes at different levels of the system (personnel, 
infrastructure, running costs are due to different processes, where the different levels central, 
regional, local are differently responsible), and takes the responsibility for resource 
management away from the schools as the location where the resources are put into use. 
Primary processes of resource management are the implementation of the respective 
                                                     
33 For a detailed overview about the distribution of serval aspects of education across the Austrian Länder see 
Lassnigg, Lorenz (2010) Oberösterreichs Bildungssystem im Benchmarking. Institute for Advanced Studies 
(IHS),Vienna (report commissioned by AK-Upper Austria) http://www.equi.at/dateien/ooebm-ak-jku-iv.pdf 
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regulations by the various authorities, and the related processes of the gathering and 
transmission of information of how the resources flow. A definite list of challenges to resource 
management was given in the 2007 report (Lassnigg et al. 2007, 60-61): 
− political expansionary dynamic of education expenditure 
−  political focus on the class size as most important ‘quality indicator’ which is the most 
cost intense policy parameter 
−  use of nominal overall class size indicator that reflected an artificially ‘worsened’ 
situation as the effective group sizes have been substantially lowered by regulations 
due to mandatory class separations (Teilungsziffern) in certain subjects, 
achievement groups, etc., but this effective group size is not reported and difficult to 
obtain because of the complex regulatory system; as a result politics is mainly 
guided by a fictional parameter 
−  class repetition increase duration of students in the system and thus automatically 
increases costs for questionable results (estimation of additional costs was roughly 
around 150 Mio EUR)  
−  institutional incongruence between financing and spending bodies 
−  lack of coherent monitoring of efficiency (monitoring only of sub-processes, if ever) 
−  comparatively high difference between personnel expenditure due to wage scheme 
and actual expenditure about 12% at time of report) 
−  complex system of regulations in service laws and collective agreements making 
personnel policy endemically intransparent and rendering steering impossible, but 
increasing the power of the teachers’ interest organisations and supporting charges 
for increased pay for each reform affecting working conditions  
−  task profile of teachers involving tasks that could be performed by staff with lower 
salaries. 
Because of the distributed and fragmented nature of the governance system the information 
and monitoring is also split up and distributed, thus there is no location where the information 
from die different processes is put together, which produces a basic and endemic state of in-
transparency about the resources spent in education. Even if each of the processes were 
transparent in itself, the systemic structure would produce in-transparency. This challenge is 
definitely well known, and periodically put to scrutiny since five decades (Lassnigg et al. 
2007, 57-61).  As a consequence, a basic intention in the statistical Volume of the National 
Education Report (NBB) has been, and still is, to provide a common categorical frame that 
allows to relate the statistical information about the different units and masses (students 
stocks and flows, graduation and retention, kinds of resources, teachers, process indicators, 
etc.) at different levels and in different sectors directly to each other. Until now this 
endeavour has only partly been successful, because the various information bases include 
different categorisations that are reflected in the statistical information. The practices of the 
different stakeholders in setting their categories are stronger than the observers trying to put 
the information together in a consistent way. Thus a review among the primary producers of 
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information and an overarching political will would be necessary to provide such a 
transparent system. Concrete main challenges at this level of the production of information 
and knowledge management are different categorisations of information about students and 
teachers, and still different categorisations of finances, and different categorisations of 
finances from different financing bodies.  
Capacity building for resource management is bound to the governance system, and 
influenced by the political culture. On the one hand formal training will only be provided for 
‘official’ tasks, on the other hand informal learning occurs of how to handle tasks in the given 
structures according to the given interests.  In sum the challenges of resource management 
are closely related to the construction of the governance system, and in particular to the 
issue of increased school autonomy. If a reform in this direction would be devised, a new 
comprehensive system of the distribution of resources must include a feasible junction of the 
now distributed functions and sub-processes, including a solution of the responsibilities at 
the different levels, and as a critical part a sufficient capacity building at the level of the 
schools, where the discretion about the use of resources should be linked much more 
directly to the performance of tasks at this level.  
A first step for the improvement of resource management should be a definitive analysis of 
the factors that constitute the gap between high expenditure and weak results. At the 
moment this gap is not sufficiently understood, to provide evidence based recommendations 
for solutions. This report contributes to the understanding of main elements of the 
challenges; however, how the different aspects play together should be systematically 
evaluated. 
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Summary, concluding remarks 
The framework 
This paper has taken up the basic framework of the Lassnigg et al. 2007 study of 
educational governance in Austria to explain the difficulties of improving the outcomes of the 
system despite substantial (additional) resources have been put into the system in recent 
decades and many reform approaches have been tried at various levels. This framework 
points to serious structural deficiencies which are hindering the development, whereas the 
existing proposals for change and reform remain at quite scattered and superficial levels. 
According to the explanatory framework the following main points must be considered:  
− First the relationship between the bureaucracy and the politicised distributional 
federalism is deeply contradictory, as the (potential) strengths of the centralised 
bureaucratic model of providing a comprehensive and consistent policy is broken by 
the federal structures, thus only the negative regulatory aspects of bureaucracy 
prevail 
− Second the bureaucracy and the politicisation of the administrative and political 
structures have been paralleled by a symbiotic institutional complementarity with the 
system of  interest representation and industrial relations; thus a very tight and 
complex web of regulations has developed that provides strong veto points and 
charges for additional allowances to any attempt for change, as always must be 
defended what has been won in the past (this structure is echoed in the reform of the 
Dienstrecht, by the extension of its implementation to a period of four decades, 
during which all the time the competing or conflicting values and practices of the ‘old’ 
and the ‘new’ will continuously blow air into the glow) 
− Third the layered and fragmented political structures, with the main political 
mechanism of the Finanzausgleich separating important aspects of the distribution of 
resources from education policy, are endemically hindering oversight and 
transparency; therefore even the statistical categories in the different sectors and on 
the different levels differ so much that a consistent data base is almost impossible to 
build up (despite the basic demands are clear already for five decades; somehow we 
might derive from the experience in this field of the provision of an information base 
a kind of a ‘law of endemically insufficient improvement’).  
− Fourth the overall constellation leads to a weak position of the schools as well as the 
local units which are dependent on the upper administrative levels, and on the 
politicians, and have too little room to move at the institutional level, so the teachers 
are driven into their classrooms where they have much discretion, and to their 
flexible use of working time outside of the school; the interest driven representation 
structure also captures the professional interests which are driven behind the 
material and power interests. 
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To find a way through this complex constellation one possibility of reducing complexity is to 
ask for more resources. So the political discourse is overwhelmed by the issue of answering 
to increasing problems – which can be found everywhere – by increasing resources, with the 
reduction of class sizes being the main quality indicator (which, however, reduces 
productivity and efficiency in economic terms; thus an endemic hostility against economics, 
and against data supporting it, can be predicted).  
Empirical findings and illustrations 
In addition to the previous study some new empirical findings or illustrations are presented, 
which underscore the propositions.  
− The basic structures of the distributional federalism have been illustrated by the 
comparison of the collection of taxes at the different political levels, and the spending 
of the resources after transfer. A specific position of the Länder is visible that collect 
very few taxes and spend much money for the salaries of their employees. If the 
institutionalist interpretation is followed that the employees provide much of a power 
base, then the transfer from the federal level pays for the power base at the Länder 
level. 
− Some international comparisons show an exceptional structure of the Austrian 
distributional federalism, which makes it unique also compared to the neighbours 
Switzerland and Germany. The distribution of responsibilities in Austria is only similar 
to very big countries, or those with national divisions, small countries don’t have a 
substantial regional level. The Swiss cantons have to collect their money by taxes; 
that constitutes a completely different constellation, and the comparison with the 
German federalism is completely biased, because in terms of scale Austria must be 
compared to German Länder, which are at this level, however, fairly centralised.  
− A look at the longer term development of educational expenditure shows an 
expansionary tendency, despite already high levels of spending (if in certain periods 
the expansion of the budget was contained, the following periods show often a 
bigger increase compared to the saving). The coming period of financial constraint 
will be interesting to be seen, the planning figures point to quite severe cuts in the 
near future (the additional resources for improvement from previous periods seem 
now to be taken back again).  
− Endemic intransparency of the distribution and use of resources can be seen as an 
important empirical finding, maybe the best illustration for this is the fact that the 
class size as the main indicator used for quality is only a nominal figure that is 
upwardly biased, because of many regulations that split classes to smaller groups, 
however, without regular information about this; the regulations are so complex that 
an easy estimation of this effect that reduces the nominal class size to an average 
effective size of teaching-learning groups is not possible (examples for the lower 
effective group size have been the achievement groups in general lower secondary 
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schools, now substituted by the team-teaching model of NMS. The substantially 
smaller Student-Teacher-Ratio rather points to the real situation.  
− Several comparisons of indicators between the Länder do not give any systematic 
structures, so the distribution of resources to the educational institutions seems 
erratic and driven by unclear interests. In particular the comparison of the 
demographic development and the development of resources spent in primary 
schools shows that most Länder with a demographic decline have substantially 
increased their resources whereas regions without decline (in particular Vienna) 
have paid a demographic penalty. If the demands from immigration are considered it 
must be concluded that the actual system of resource distribution is not able to 
channel the resources according to the demand (comparisons to the federal level 
indicate, that the erratic structure of the Länder rather influences that level than the 
other way round).  
Identified challenges 
Many specific challenges have been identified at different levels and in different sectors, 
which must be brought together somehow in order to provide some guidance for what should 
be done. The main identified challenges in Austrian schools are fourfold: (i) the discrepancy 
between high expenditure and moderate results, (ii) the needs resulting from migration, (iii) 
social reproduction, (iv) current and future budget constraints.  
As outlined two strategies can be used for the improvement of efficiency, reduction of 
expenditure with given results, or improvement of results with given expenditure. So far a 
third way has been chosen, to increase expenditure (in particular teaching resources) with 
the hope of bringing about better results. As part of the current and mid-term financial 
consolidation path the resources for education seem now severely under scrutiny. Thus the 
recent strategies must come to a halt, and new strategies must be found. However, as this 
turn has been chosen without preparation, the costs of adaptation might be high. Finding a 
strategy for the improvement of efficiency without destroying the positive motivations and 
triggering conflict seems to be the biggest challenge at the moment and in the short and mid-
term perspective. Based on the sketched basic framework and the fragmented structures not 
much optimism for finding such a strategy seems appropriate. It seems for sure that without 
a serious preparation of policies for improving efficiency an improvement of the results will 
be unlikely. Several policies and instruments for improvement have been brought into start 
during recent years (standards, SQA, QIBB, new teacher education), however, these need 
motivation and resources to be used for improvement, otherwise the real danger exists that 
these measures (which are not fully positively endorsed in the system, and to some extent 
under conflict by powerful players) will only be used for increased control which probably will 
not lead to improvement. In this sense the current period of financial austerity comes at a 
quite difficult point of development of Austrian education. 
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In terms of governance the previous study has already identified four areas. As indicated in 
the title to this paper, steps towards improvement along these paths will presuppose the will 
to rethink the basic structures of governance: 
i. Congruent distribution of responsibilities. Resolving the problems of intersecting 
responsibilities among the authority levels, in particular in the direction that a 
definitive congruence between the tasks/duties of governing actors and the 
responsibilities for financing and spending is reached (the actual incongruence that 
the federal level is responsible for financing, whereas the Länder level is responsible 
for spending in the main sector of teachers in compulsory schools, and the duties 
are mixed is seen as a major problem reducing efficiency). The problems resulting 
from the given constellation have been further underlined by this study. Current 
political signals are pointing in a direction that due to a less complex distribution of 
responsibilities the incongruent distribution of responsibilities might be aggravated 
by giving more responsibilities of provision to the Länder, who then can charge the 
resources from the federal taxes. A clear recommendation is that the Länder should 
have only those responsibilities which they can finance from their own tax collection. 
If such a move that would substantially change the Austrian federalism is not done, 
no more responsibilities should be given to the Länder. 
ii. School autonomy. Designing, regulating and implementing sufficient conditions for 
pedagogic work at the school level based on concepts of school autonomy, by 
providing room for discretion and abandoning the bureaucratic and organisational 
obstacles for work at school (paralleled by the establishment of sufficient monitoring 
of achievement). A viable and credible structure of school autonomy should be 
worked out which does not exist at the moment. There are different proposals and 
much rhetoric in the air, and political conflicts running around them. 
iii. Reform of the system of industrial relations. Development of effective structures of 
industrial relations and working conditions in education, in particular reform or 
abandonment of Dienstrecht and shaping of attractive and flexible working 
conditions by changing the inflexible and tayloristic regulations and structures of 
payment of the salaries (devising teachers’ work on the basis of professional 
principles instead as a collection of tayloristic points of effort constituting the salary). 
Steps towards reform have been done, however, also here the above mentioned 
‘law of endemically insufficient improvement’ probably applies. As a new reform can 
only be expected after forty years when the current one will be implemented, a 
possible development path would be to strengthen professionalism as far as 
possible and at all costs. Maybe a rule could be that every step or measure taken 
must be evaluated due to its effects on professionalism, which in this course must 
also be defined and set alive.  
iv. Comprehensive funding structures according to efficiency and equity. Allocation of 
funding through simplified structures of responsibilities according to specified criteria 
of efficiency and equity, and considering the main challenges for education; a 
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comprehensive system must include the Finanzausgleich. This area will be a ‘hot 
topic’ in the near future, as new negotiations have already started. Here pushes 
towards transparency are necessary, and the distribution of the funds should be 
linked to clear educational strategies.  
In any case will a precondition for understanding and improvement be the production of 
sufficient information and transparency about the use of resources. To this topic the previous 
study has given a recommendation that will finally be cited here. The concept is based on 
the idea that the statistical information and the management information should be linked, in 
order to produce good results and good statistics, the challenge is how to produce 
information that steps across the existing fragmentations and segmentations. The expected 
progress in the citation has clearly been overstated, two rounds of the National Education 
Report have brought some steps, but more is left to be done even at this level… 
„Die Entwicklung der statistischen Informationssysteme hängt von der Nutzung 
im System für Qualitätsentwicklung und Qualitätssicherung ab. Daher sollten 
die Schulen in die Rückkoppelungsprozesse über das statistische 
Informationssystem einbezogen werden, indem erstens Referenzwerte für 
bestimmte Typen von Schulen produziert werden und zweitens die Schulen für 
ihren eigenen Bereich die Vergleichswerte besitzen sollten. Für diesen Zweck 
sind Qualitätsindikatoren zu entwickeln, die die verschiedenen Dimensionen 
von Information bündeln und verwerten, insbesondere SchülerInnen, 
LehrerInnen, Infrastruktur, Arbeitsorganisation und Unterricht, Finanzen und 
Kontextinformationen insbesondere über den sozialen und regionalen 
Hintergrund. Entwicklungen in dieser Richtung sind im Gange, jedoch gibt es 
nach wie vor große Lücken in den erforderlichen Datenbeständen.“ (Lassnigg et 
al. 2007, 182) 
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ANNEX 1: Austrian governance structure in a comparative perspective 
Annex 1-a: Governance Typology, number of decision levels per country  
  Levels (main) Levels + 
Sum 
Levels School  Central Local Province State 
Sub- 
region School Central Local Province State 
Sub- 
region 
Netherlands 2   2 x x         86 14         
England 2   2 x   x       75   25       
Belgium (Fl.) 2   2 x       x   71       29   
Australia 2   2 x       x   42       58   
Portugal 2   2 x x         26 74         
Luxembourg 2   2 x x         15 85         
Finland 2   2 x   x       15   85       
 AVERAGE Gr.1 2                47 25 16   12   Estonia 2 1 2+1 x (x) x       69 4 27       
Hungary 2 1 2+1 x (x) x       63 10 27       
Slovak Republic 2 1 2+1 x x (x)       59 40 1       
Iceland 2 1 2+1 x (x) x       55 3 42       
 AVERAGE Gr.2 2 1               62 14 24       
Scotland 3   3 x x x       48 15 37       
Sweden 3   3 x x x       47 18 35       
Slovenia 3   3 x x x       43 41 15       
Denmark 3   3 x x x       41 22 37       
Turkey 3   3 x x   x     19 63   18     
Norway 3   3 x x x       18 21 62       
Mexico 3   3 x x     x   17 46     37   
 AVERAGE Gr.3 3                 33 32 27 3 5   
Czech Republic 2 2 2+2 x (x) x (x)     73 1 24 3     
Korea 3 1 3+1 x x (x) x     42 27 6 26     
Italy 3 1 3+1 x x (x) x     39 36 8 16     
France 3 1 3+1 x x   (x)   x 34 29   6   31 
 AVERAGE Gr.4 2,75 1,25               47 23 9 13   8 
Austria 4   4 x x x   x   30 27 22   22   
Spain 4   4 x x   x x   29 16   16 39   
Japan 4   4 x x x x     21 13 45 21     
Germany 3 2 3+2 x   x (x) x (x) 23   31 5 31 10 
 AVERAGE Gr.5 3,75 0,5               26 14 24 11 23 2 
OECD average 3 3 3+3 x x x (x) (x) (x) 41 23 19 5 10 2 
Sum       26 17+4 14+3 5+4 6+1 1+2             
Source: Own calculations based on OECD 2012 EAG 
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Annex 1-b: Governance Typology, number of decision levels per country  
(based on Annex 1—a) 
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Annex 1-c: Decisions at school level 
% domains compared to average % decisions at this level, 2011 (scatter) 
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% decisions per domain taken at school level compared to overall decisions taken at school level, 2011 
 
86
81
68 67
62 59
49 47 44
41 39 38
32 31
25 23 22 21 19 17 15 13
5
100
78
75
89 89 89
75 78
89
78
89
78 78
56 56 56
67
33
44
11
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
U
ni
te
dK
in
gd
om
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ar
k
av
 S
ch
oo
l
Ko
re
a
Ita
ly
Fr
an
ce
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Ja
pa
n
Tu
rk
ey
M
ex
ic
o
N
or
w
ay
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
re
ec
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 . 13 . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
av School Instruction
86
81
68 67
62 59
49 47 44
41 39 38
32 31
25 23 22 21 19 17 15 13
5
100 100
67 67
42
63
13
58
33 31
13
6
13
4 4 17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
U
ni
te
dK
in
gd
om
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ar
k
av
 S
ch
oo
l
Ko
re
a
Ita
ly
Fr
an
ce
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Ja
pa
n
Tu
rk
ey
M
ex
ic
o
N
or
w
ay
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
re
ec
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 . 13 . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
av School Personnel
86
81
68 67
62 59
49 47 44
41 39 38
32 31
25 23 22 21 19 17 15 13
5
100 100
67 67
42
63
13
33
31
13
6
13
4 4 17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
U
ni
te
dK
in
gd
om
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ar
k
av
 S
ch
oo
l
Ko
re
a
Ita
ly
Fr
an
ce
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Ja
pa
n
Tu
rk
ey
M
ex
ic
o
N
or
w
ay
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
re
ec
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 . 13 . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
av School Planning
86
81
68 67
62 59
49 47 44
41 39 38
32 31
25 23 22 21 19 17 15 13
5
100
75
35
79
67
50
67
42
54
32
35
29
8
21
17 17
8 8
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
U
ni
te
dK
in
gd
om
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
ed
en
De
nm
ar
k
av
 S
ch
oo
l
Ko
re
a
Ita
ly
Fr
an
ce
Au
st
ria
Sp
ai
n
G
er
m
an
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Ja
pa
n
Tu
rk
ey
M
ex
ic
o
N
or
w
ay
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
re
ec
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 . 13 . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
av School Resources
54 — Lassnigg, Vogtenhuber / Educational governance — I H S 
 
Annex 1-d: Decisions at central level 
% domains compared to average % decisions at this level, 2011 (scatter) 
 
 
 
AV
AT
R² = 0,6969
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 in
st
ru
ct
io
n 
de
ci
sio
ns
 a
t c
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l
% average decisions at central level
AV
AT
R² = 0,8673
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 p
er
so
nn
el
 d
ec
isi
on
s a
t c
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l
% average decisions at central level
AV
AT
R² = 0,7146
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 p
la
nn
in
g 
de
ci
sio
ns
 a
t c
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l
% average decisions at central level
AV
AT
R² = 0,9457
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 re
so
ur
ce
s d
ec
isi
on
s a
t c
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l
% average decisions at central level
I H S — Lassnigg, Vogtenhuber / Educational governance — 55 
% decisions per domain taken at central level compared to overall decisions taken at central level, 2011 
 
87 83
78 78
61 59
55
51
38 36 36 33 32
25 22 21
18 14 13 10
3 1
56
33
56
44
33
11 11 11 11
15
22
25
11 11
0
11
0 0 0
11
11
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
ex
ic
o
G
re
ec
e
Po
rt
ug
al
Tu
rk
ey
Sp
ai
n
Au
st
ria
Au
st
ra
lia
Ita
ly
av
 C
en
tr
al
G
er
m
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
Ko
re
a
De
nm
ar
k
N
or
w
ay
Sw
ed
en
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ja
pa
n
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 . 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
av Central Instruction
87 83
78
78
61 59
55
51
38 36 36 33 32
25 22 21 18 14 13 10
3 1
100
100
75
83
92
88
67
88
44
39
33
33
63
33
25
0 0 0 0 0 0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
ex
ic
o
G
re
ec
e
Po
rt
ug
al
Tu
rk
ey
Sp
ai
n
Au
st
ria
Au
st
ra
lia
Ita
ly
av
 C
en
tr
al
G
er
m
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
Ko
re
a
De
nm
ar
k
N
or
w
ay
Sw
ed
en
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ja
pa
n
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 . 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
av Central Personnel
87
83
78 78
61 59
55
51
38 36 36 33 32
25 22 21 18 14 13 10
3 1
100
100 100 100
60
80
90
71
57
60
57
50 43 50
64
71
70
57
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
ex
ic
o
G
re
ec
e
Po
rt
ug
al
Tu
rk
ey
Sp
ai
n
Au
st
ria
Au
st
ra
lia
Ita
ly
av
 C
en
tr
al
G
er
m
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
Ko
re
a
De
nm
ar
k
N
or
w
ay
Sw
ed
en
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ja
pa
n
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 . 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
av Central Planning
87
83
78 78
61 59
55
51
38 36 36 33 32
25 22 21 18 14 13 10
3 1
92 100
83 83
58 58
52
33
42
31
31
25
13
6
0 0
0 0
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
ex
ic
o
G
re
ec
e
Po
rt
ug
al
Tu
rk
ey
Sp
ai
n
Au
st
ria
Au
st
ra
lia
Ita
ly
av
 C
en
tr
al
G
er
m
an
y
Sl
ov
ak
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
Ko
re
a
De
nm
ar
k
N
or
w
ay
Sw
ed
en
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ja
pa
n
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ic
el
an
d
Cz
ec
hR
ep
ub
lic
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 . 8 9 . av . 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
av Central Resources
56 — Lassnigg, Vogtenhuber / Educational governance — I H S 
 
Annex 1-e: Decisions at regional level 
% domains compared to average % decisions at this level, 2011 (scatter) 
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% decisions per domain taken at regional level compared to overall decisions taken at regional level, 2011 
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Annex 1-f: Decisions at local level 
% domains compared to average % decisions at this level, 2011 (scatter) 
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% decisions per domain taken at local level compared to overall decisions taken at local level, 2011 
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ANNEX 2: Educational expenditure, detailed 2009-13 
 
Ausg. 2009-13 p.a. % v.Unterricht Zuwachs 2009-13 
% Zuwachs 
2009-13 
SCHULE einschl. LEHRPERSONAL 
    Pflichtschulen Primar und Sek I 3.370,98 44,8% 310,0 32,2% 
Pflichtschulen Sek II 152,16 2,0% 7,0 0,7% 
AHS gesamt 1.321,32 17,6% 71,1 7,4% 
BMHS 1.319,52 17,5% 60,9 6,3% 
BAKIP/BASOP 75,61 1,0% -18,0 -1,9% 
Zweckgeb.Geb.BundesS (AB92) 27,93 0,4% 4,6 0,5% 
Auslandsschulen (AB92) 17,86 0,2% 27,8 2,9% 
Heime und Sonstige 22,43 0,3% -3,6 -0,4% 
Private Träger (ABMHS), tw. Umschichtung 191,93 2,5% 183,3 19,1% 
SUMME: Schule einschließlich Lehrpersonal 6.499,72 86,4% 643,2 66,9% 
 
  
   STEUERUNG, SERVICES, INFRASTRUKTUR    
   Zentralstelle ab 2011 46,86 0,6% 
  Regionale Schulverwaltung 102,85 1,4% 10,3 1,1% 
Infrastruktur (BIG-Mieten etc.)  491,41 6,5% 247,0 25,7% 
Qualitätsentwicklung und Steuerung ab 2011 23,96 0,3% 
  Lehrer/innenbildung (PH) 170,07 2,3% 69,0 7,2% 
LLL (Erwachsenenbi.) 35,93 0,5% 26,3 2,7% 
Förderungen/Transfers (sozioök. Maßn.) ab 2011  71,40 0,9% 
  [Zentralleitung ohne Infrastruktur]  84,56 1,1% -34,1 -3,5% 
SUMME: Steuerung, Services, Infrastruktur 1.027,04 13,6% 318,5 33,1% 
 
  
   TOTAL Unterricht 7.526,76 100,0% 961,8 100,0% 
 
  
   GESAMTBUDGET 70.600,85 10,7% 6.110,1 15,7% 
Source: own calculation based on financial statistics 
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ANNEX 3: PISA annualised change reading, mathematics compared to PIAAC 
a) Reading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 — Lassnigg, Vogtenhuber / Educational governance — I H S 
 
b) Mathematics 
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 PIAAC Participation neutral;  Veränderung positive;  negativ 
The annualised change is the average annual change in PISA score points from a country/economy's earliest participation in PISA to 
PISA 2012. It is calculated taking into account all country/economy's participation in PISA. For more details on the calculation of the 
annualised change, see Annex A5. OECD average 2003 compares only OECD countries with comparable mathematics scores since 
2003. Countries and economies are ranked in descending order of the annualised change in mathematics performance. Source: OECD, 
PISA 2012 Database, Table I.2.3b. 
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ANNEX 4: Population and immigration, demographic 
prognoses 2010-2075 
 
Source: IHS-WIFO 2013 
 
Source: IHS-WIFO 2013 
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Source: IHS-WIFO 2013 
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ANNEX 5: Indicators about resource distribution across 
Länder 
Annex 5-a: School size by Länder - no consistent pattern 
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Annex 5-b: Comparison of highest and lowest school sizes by regions, 14 school types 
 
sen prep prim lowsecg nms lowsecac Tot othg health othv bms upsecac teach bhs ptvoc times max times min
AV 46 66 107 116 124 403 189 68 85 112 114 265 310 439 815
Burgenland 30 32 57 78 148 393 120 26 48 188 70 226 428 412 561 0 5
Carinthia 22 103 88 115 183 466 183 88 115 292 107 240 524 453 795 4 1
Lower Austria 38 50 100 98 105 447 163 36 65 61 123 247 283 388 775 0 3
Upper Austria 39 67 105 116 115 392 189 38 80 127 107 256 310 452 998 1 0
Salzburg 69 62 115 162 123 359 199 101 87 85 106 257 309 387 761 0 1
Styria 30 54 91 100 100 384 169 49 89 117 84 278 255 400 937 0 2
Tyrol 48 55 75 109 131 386 148 34 98 165 118 288 262 369 568 1 1
Vorarlberg 66 99 102 209 218 388 191 23 108 70 163 278 328 466 885 2 1
Vienna 85 197 248 149 116 398 326 149 93 103 174 280 368 628 834 6 0
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Annex 5-c: Compulsory schools, class size and student/teacher ratio by Länder, school 
types 
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Annex 5-d: Compulsory schools, class size and student/teacher ratio by Länder, school 
types, Index Austria = 100   
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Annex 5-e: Compulsory schools, class size in Länder, scatters by different school types  
Länder without Vienna  including Vienna 
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